Vztah mezi Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi v Turecku a Milli Görü v Nizozemí by Meerkerk, Petronella Helena Maria
UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE 




Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi 
v Turecku 
a Milli Görü§ 
v Nizozemí
Nelleke Meerkerk
M ezinárodní Politika a Ekonomika
2006/2007
Doc. PhDr. Bořek Hnízdo,
Mgr. Sabina Středová 
únor 2006
autor:





CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE 
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
THESIS
Relation between the 
Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi 
in Turkey 
and the Milli Görü§ 
in the Netherlands
writer:




date of handing in:
Nelleke M eerkerk
International Politics and Economics 
2006/2007
Doc. PhDr. Bořek Hnízdo,
Mgr. Sabina Středová 
February 2006
Nelleke Meerkerk - 2 - IEPS, February 2007
By signing below, the author certifies that the work contained herein is their own, 
and that all sources have been duly cited.
Nelleke Meerkerk - 3 - 1EPS, February 2007
Table of contents
Chapter 1 -  Introduction.........................................................................................................................
1.1. Preface.................................................................................................................................. - 5 -
1.2 Research methods...............................................................................................................- 10 -
1.3 Outline of the thesis .......................................................................................................... - 12 -
Chapter 2 -  History of Islamism in T u rk ey .....................................................................................
2.1 The downfall of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk’s anti-Islamic reforms...............- 13 -
2.2 Turkey after the Second World War, multiparty system developed.................. - 23 -
2.3 Turkey’s last elections, political reforms................................................................... - 28 -
2.4 The main players in the Turkish Islamist s tream ..................................................... - 36 -
2.5 Recently Islamist gets more support in T u rk ey ........................................................- 42 -
Chapter 3 -  Turkish migration to the Netherlands.........................................................................
3.1 Turkish immigrants to Western Europe/ the Netherlands...................................... - 47 -
3.2 The Turkish minority in the Netherlands................................................................... - 54 -
3.3 Turkish organizations and movements in the Netherlands....................................- 61 -
3.4 The Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands..............................................................................- 67 -
Chapter 4 -  Relations between Turkish Islamist and the Netherlands....................................
4.1 The links between the Turkey’s Islamists and Milli Görü§...................................- 71 -
4.2 Last developments of Milli Görü§, under increasing Turkish influence........... - 77 -
4.3 The role and attitude of the Dutch governm ent......................................................-7 9  -
4.3.1 The Westermoskee as a case study................................................................... - 81 -
Chapter 5 -  Islamist politics in the Netherlands...................................................................- 83 -
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................- 85 -
Appendix 1 -  List of Turkish political parties...................................................................... - 87 -
Appendix 2 -  Symbolism in Islamist political movements...............................................- 89 -
Appendix 3 -  Interview with Mustafa H am urcu ..................................................................- 90 -
References........................................................................................................................................- 93 -
Nelleke Meerkerk - 4 - IEPS, February 2007
Chapter 1 -  Introduction
1.1. Preface
The topic of my thesis will be the relation between the AKP, the ruling Turkish political 
party and the Milli Görüs, the biggest Turkish Islamic movement in the Netherlands. 
After studying Anthropology and Turkish culture in the Netherlands and International 
Politics in Prague I would like to make a combination of those two topics.
I am from the Netherlands and our country has a lot of immigrants. The biggest 
minority group is the Turkish one. I don’t want to state that integration completely 
failed but there are many indicators that the Turks had formed their own community 
within the Dutch one. The Netherlands is widely regarded as a liberal country and that 
is true in many respects. The immigrants who came to our country, after the Second 
World War and later on, had the change to find their own organizations, churches, 
mosques and schools etc. However, problems occurred in the integration process. 
Turkish people are less educated; more likely to be unemployed and in general they 
stick together with people from their own background. Some are suffering of identity 
problems as they don’t belong to neither of the societies.
As a result of this separation the Turkish society in the Netherlands is a very close one; 
the people stick together and idolize the life which they had in Turkey. Social get- 
together, language and their religion are very important for the immigrants. Last 
decades Turkish people founded over 1200 organizations; at least 350 of them are 
Islamic based. The biggest movement which mixes social work and religion is the Milli 
Görü§. (National Vision) After I started to think about writing on this subject I noticed 
that many people in the Netherlands don’t know anything about the Milli Görü§. This 
only strengthened me in continuing my research, a Turkish Dutch organization with 
30,000 members is worth to do research on.
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What are Milli Görü§’ aims, what do they want, are they after integration into Dutch 
society? Are there any political ambitions? Are they linked with Turkey, if yes: in what 
way?
The understanding and cooperation between Dutch and Turkish people at the moment is 
not a good one. Things got worse after Theo van Gogh was murdered by an Islamist.
The gap between Dutch people and the immigrants have widened and distrust is 
replacing the normal tolerance.
Since the 1960’s, when the first guest workers came to the Netherlands the situation in 
Turkey has naturally changed as well. After three military coups and unrest in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, politics in Turkey seemed to be stabilized. Under the surface, 
however, an Islamist revival can be seen in Turkey. The army, the protectors of 
Atatürk’s thoughts, took violently over power in the restless period Turkey faced. 
Recently the army strategy is a different one; parties which are not following the secular 
and innovative ideas get outlawed. Politicians are sent to jail, as parties based on Islam 
are not allowed. At the moment the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and 
Development Party) is the ruling party in Turkey, this is the successor party of the 
Islamist Milli Nizam Partisi, Fazilet and Refah parties. However, the AKP claims to 
have lost the severe Islamist ideas of their predecessors.
Several opinions can be found to the questions whether the AKP is an Islamist party or 
not. I decided to regard AKP representing a more liberal but still Islamist party. Their 
leader Erdogan is convicted for spreading religious hatred ideas and the laws the AKP 
is trying to implement indicate the same. The party won the 2002 elections 
overwhelmingly so we can not underestimate the power of the AKP has in Turkey.
While the AKP is representing the more liberal stream in Islamism, the small Saadet 
Partisi represents the more conservative Islamic off shoot of the former, banned, Fazilet 
Party.
Nelleke Meerkerk - 6 - IEPS, February 2007
Erbakan, the former president and leader of Fazilet is at the moment an old man. He is 
in jail, but rumors are persistent that he is actually the true leader of Islamism behind 
the screens. Others stories which turn up from time to time, is that the AKP has a 
hidden agenda and the plans they have are not that democratic and secular as one might 
think.
In my thesis I would like to find out what kind of goals and aims the AKP has in Turkey 
do they really have the “hidden agenda” which is often mentioned in the newspapers? I 
will look at their thoughts and try to find out what the AKP really is. AKP itself claims 
to be a moderate Islamic political party, which believes fully in democracy, without any 
plans for installing an Islamist based state in Turkey.
The Dutch Milli Görü§ and the Islamists in Turkey have a lot of contact, and what is it 
that the Turkish political parties want? Both the Milli Görü§ and the AKP and SP are 
deriving from one thought, described by Erbakan a few decades ago. Is this still 
assuring ties between the groups? Does the AKP use the Milli Görü§ as lobby group; do 
the Dutch Turks support the Islamic revival which is taking place in Turkey?
My thesis is the following:
The Islam ist parties in Turkey use M illi Görii§ in the Netherlands to reach their 
political goals in Turkey.
I will pay attention to the history of Turkey, focused on the political Islam. What 
happened to Islamic parties and politicians for instance? A special focus will be on the 
coups, when the army protected Atatürk’s secular state. The second important issue is 
the history of Turkish immigration to the Netherlands. When did the immigrants arrive, 
what happened to them afterwards? I will prove that they are badly integrated into 
Dutch society, and stick together in their own social, often religious based groups.
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My research on the broad spectrum Turkish movements in the Netherlands will be 
mainly on the Milli Görü? movement. This movement claims to be a religious and 
social one, but maybe they have some political ideas as well. Who are their leaders, 
what is their tie with Turkey? The name Milli Görü§ derives from a pamphlet written by 
Erbakan. In this pamphlet is explained how an Islamic state should replace secular 
Turkey. Currently many leaders of Turkey, the AKP and Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands 
are inspired by him and his ideas. The former German leader of the Milli Görü§ is as 
well a nephew of the former president Erbakan.
As well the Diyanet, the ministry of religious affairs in Turkey, is trying to influence, 
shape and help their citizens abroad. The Diyanet has totally other ideas about the way 
to deal with Turks abroad and their religious needs for example. In my thesis I will also 
do research on the Diyanet for this reason.
I will try to find out whether, and how, the AKP with leader Erdogan, and possibly 
Erbakan in the background, is actually trying to use the Milli Görü§ abroad for its goals. 
Do they need the money, coming from Western Europe? Are the Dutch Turks still 
allowed to vote for elections in Turkey? The well educated and westernized people who 
run the show for Milli Görü? in the Netherlands can also be used as a lobby group for 
the AKP in Turkey. They might also be able to influence the ideas the Dutch 
government has about their Turkish inhabitants.
I will show that Milli Görü§ since May 2006 has a new, said to be more radical, 
chairman. The new leader was appointed in the Netherlands under pressure of the 
German, more fundamental wing of the organization. The Cologne department is 
headed by more extreme Islamist and closely watched by the German intelligence 
service. In my thesis I will show that the Dutch government was not inspecting that 
closely the Milli Görü§ movement but after the May 2006 events they started to worry 
as well. Not without any reason, as in my research it will become clear that the Islamist 
movement in Turkey is actually trying to use the Dutch Milli Görü§ for their own 
purposes.
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AKP’s aims are the gradually installations of Islamic reforms in Turkey and Milli Görü§ 
in Western Europe is serving as a great help for them. Human resources, votes, money 
and a valuable lobby group in Western Europe.
As last remark will be the elections in the Netherlands where for the first time an 
Islamic based party ran for elections. This party was not successful but might open the 
way for new parties based on Islam. As the Milli Görü§ has such a well educated 
leaders and a good structure they might start a political party. The already are respected 
conversations partner of the government and have a lot of experience in public 
administration.
To conclude I will prove that because of demographic changes half of the young people 
in the big cities are Muslim. This number will only grow and because of this fact the 
political landscape will face major changes.
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1.2 Research methods
For doing research on the history of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey it was not so hard 
to find good literature, many books appeared on this topic. In the Dutch libraries 
especially I found many books with detailed information. More than Czech Republic 
they are specialized on this theme, as the Netherlands has so many Turkish immigrants.
I have found good reports from the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS, Central 
Office for Statistics) and the Wetenschappelijke raad voor het regeringsbeleid (WRR, 
Scientific Council for Government Policies) for data on Turkish people in the 
Netherlands; integration, number of mosques, names of organizations and so on.
Furthermore I decided to use as a primary source websites from the Turkish political 
parties I am focusing on. The last elections in Turkey were in 2002 and not many books 
with analysis have been published yet. The Middle East Journal, Middle East Quarterly 
and Meria (The Middle East Review of International Affairs) have their articles online 
and turned out to be very useful.
It is obvious that I followed the Dutch media intensively, especially Volkskrant and 
Parool. The Milli Görü§ was often mentioned and the media attention was growing 
during my writing period. All the translations from Dutch to English are mine; of course 
I am responsible for possible mistakes. Thanks to some Turkish friends I was able to 
translate some articles from important online Turkish websites e.g. Aksam or the 
Milligazette.
It was sometimes very hard for me to write my thesis in Prague, as Milli Görü§ is 
settled in the Netherlands. I have been writing many emails and tried to find out 
telephone numbers and so on, but getting in contact was sometimes very hard. The Milli 
Görü§ movement has for example no web page. However, I was in contact with some 
Dutch experts by email and it was very motivating for my research to get some 
information first hand.
Nelleke Meerkerk - 10- IEPS, February 2007
Finally, when the thesis was almost finished I got in contact with Mustafa Hamurcu. Mr. 
Hamurcu is the spokesman of the Milli Görü§ in the Northern Netherlands. After we 
had email contact we met each other in Amsterdam in the Milli Görü§ office. We had a 
pleasant talk, in which he explained a lot about the Milli Görü§ and 1 was able to get 
almost all my questions answered. It was very nice to meet somebody who is actual 
member of the Milli Görü§ and not writing on it as an outsider. Hopefully I an am able 
to make his opinion understandable in my thesis, it is important for the thesis. 
Furthermore I have been in contact with Mr. Syp Wynia, the chief editor of Dutch 
weekly Elsevier. Wynia is doing research on both integration of Turks and the accession 
of Turkey to the European Union. He published repeatedly articles about the Milli 
Görü§ and integration. I am very happy that he helped by giving me an interview which 
he did with the Turkish ambassador to the Netherlands. Unfortunately I have no 
permission to quote this, but as background information it was very useful.
Last but not least: I want to mention Arif Potmis from the Dutch political party Islam 
Democrats. He was so kind to explain me the relation with the Milli Görü§.
During the writing process many people supported and helped me. Some of the people I 
would like to say a special thank you. Ertan Suleyman thanks for you never ending 
advice and translations about Turkish politics. Chris Svorcik, for reading parts of my 
thesis and comment it. Also the Carcasonne evenings helped me a lot... Ondřej 
Červinka, for helping me writing and being “nádherný” critical. Furthermore Ozlem 
Alioglu thanks for reading together with me many Turkish websites. Sabina Středová, 
my tutor. She was a great help, reading the first versions and help me to decide which 
direction to take while writing my thesis. Alice and Liz; you have been great to correct 
my English. Thanks to all my family and other friends in the Netherlands and The 
Czech Republic, for supporting me with emails, phone calls and messages. People at 
Karlova Univerzita: among others Markéta Žídková, Cyril Šimsa and Petra Chumanová 
thanks for arranging everything in time in order to graduate
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1.3 Outline of the thesis
In the first part I will focus on the history of Turkey. Described will be the Islamic 
Ottoman Empire, the big secular changes which occurred under Atatürk. A big part will 
deal with the current Islamist leaders and their parties. I will show that Erdogan, the 
current prime minister, and his so called tutor Erbakan are main players in the Islamist 
movement in Turkey.
The second part will focus on the Turks living in the Netherlands. Started to arrive in 
the late 1960’s, nowadays they make up the biggest minority group. The group faces 
integrations problems, lies behind with education, have difficulties to find jobs and so 
on. The Turkish people founded around 1200 organizations, and more than 200 
mosques. The biggest Islamic religious social movement in Western Europe is the Milli 
Görü§. It will be further explained what the Milli Görü§ exactly is, as can be argued as 
well that the movement might have a political goal as well.
The third part will try to make the link between the Dutch Milli Görü§ and the Islamist 
stream in Turkey. It will contain the conclusion of my thesis. I made a case study about 
the new mosque the Milli Görü? wants to build in the Netherlands and what problems 
they face doing so.
Part number four is a short overview of the last events in the Netherlands. The new 
board of the Milli Görü§ is trying to give the organization a positive image, but the 
media is not too helpful. I got the change to speak with their spokesman and he told me 
about their projects and future plans. Unfortunately I did not have time to closely do 
research on their current projects and their influence on their supporters and the Dutch 
people. I regret this, and would like to do more detailed study. This topical subject is 
without any doubt ground for a fascinating next research.
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Chapter 2 -  History of Islamism in Turkey
2.1 The downfall of the Ottoman Em pire, A tatiirk’s anti-Islam ic reforms.
To understand contemporary Turkey, and its politics, it is necessary to go back to the 
days before and shortly after the dissolution of the great Ottoman Empire. At its height, 
this empire stretched from the western coast of North Africa to the frontiers of China, 
and from southern Poland to what is now Tanzania.1 The Ottoman Empire was an 
Islamic based state, meaning that the Tarrikat (Islamic religious order) had the power. 
They were the religious educated men who had spiritual, economic as well as political 
power. The Empire was headed by a Sultan, for almost four centuries. A Sultan was the 
worldly leaders of Ottoman Empire, which was holding as well the title of Caliph. The 
Caliphate was the religious office of the entire Islamic world, and was held from 1453 
by the Ottoman Empire. The task of the Caliph was “to create the socioeconomic 
conditions needed to allow those citizens to live in accordance with Islam’s tenets.”2 
The Ottoman Sultan, as the Caliph, represented the religious leadership for Muslims all 
over the world. It is very important for Muslims to unite political power and religion. In 
this respect the Islamic calendar, which started with the installation of the first Islamic 
government, can be mentioned.3 This is just one example of how important the bond 
between politics and religion is for the authentic Islamic religion.
From 1600, with some intervals, the Ottoman Empire was already in decline. The 
Empire had the nickname, the Sick Man of Europe. Due to its size it had problems to 
integrate, many different economic interests and a lot of different ethnic groups assured 
internal problems. 4 Nationalism grew at the end of the 19th century and from time to 
time the Empire had to give up pieces of their land. The European powers at that time
' h t tp : / /m ediagu ideto is lam .s fsu .edu /in thew orld /02a  c ivilization.htm
2 ibid
1 ibid
4 (2) Zürcher,  E. J. -  Een gesch ieden is  van het m oderne  Turkije  -  SUN, A m sterdam  2006
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had only one solution for Turkey, and one problem related to that: “how to dispose of 
the Sick Man's territories without upsetting the European balance of power” .5 
On the website6 which describes the downfall of big empires the downfall of the 
Ottoman Empire is blamed on Europe. It says that “European colonialism began to take 
its toll on the empire” and that some Muslims still see the downfall of their Caliphate as 
following: “the loss of political power as a result of European colonialism”. In my 
opinion the downfall of the Ottoman Empire is much more complicated; already in 1875 
the Ottoman leaders could not avoid nationalist uprisings. The provinces of Serbia, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Bulgaria declared their independence from the Empire in that 
year. Following the Russian Turkish War of 1877-78, independence was formally 
granted to Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Montenegro, with the other Balkan territories 
remaining under Ottoman control. It was only a question of time before the Ottoman 
Empire would collapse.
This important position which the Ottoman Empire had in the Islamic world finally 
came to an end after gradually losing their power for a few decades in 1918. The 
Ottoman Empire had fought in the First World War against the Allies. During this war 
the Sultan had even called for a Jihad (holy war) from all Muslims against the Allied 
troops.7 Finally, after the First World War the territory of the Empire was divided by 
several, sometimes secret, diplomatic agreements between the Allied countries. “During 
the war, the Allies had negotiated a series of agreements that outlined not only the 
definitive dismantling of the Ottoman Empire but also the partitioning among them of 
what Turkish nationalists had come to regard as the Turkish homeland.”8 The Allies did 
not play a fair game; they made promises which were contradictory. One of the 
countries suffering from that unfair game was the Ottoman Empire.
5http://w ww .turk ishnew s.com /D iscoverTurkev/anato lia /h is to rv .  hi ml
6 h t tp : / /m ediagu ideto is lam .sfsu .edu /in theworld /02a  civilization.htm
7 h t tp : / /w w w .firs tw oildw ar .com /source /o ttom an fetva.htm
8 http : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/13.h tm
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Under the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, which was signed 19th May 1916, the British 
and French divided the Ottoman Empire; in case it would lose the war. For example, 
coastal parts in advance were promised to Italy and Greece without any consultation 
with the Ottoman Sultan.9
During the First World War the British had also given their word to the Sharif of Mecca, 
Hussein bin Ali, to make him king of the Arabs. Also Arabs were living under Ottoman 
rule so they wanted to obtain more freedom. In exchange for his support he would get 
parts of the Ottoman Empire as well. The new map of the region, including new 
countries like Syria and Lebanon, was finally laid down by the newly created League of 
Nations.
All plans were written down and became known as the Treaty of Sevres, which was 
meant to solve the problems of the division of the Ottoman Empire. In 1920, the 
Sultan’s representatives signed the Treaty of Sevres which would have limited Turkey 
to the Anatolian Plateau. This treaty gave the Ottomans only a small piece of land, and 
tight restrictions on, among other things, the size of the army.10 Sultan Mehmet VI, the 
last Caliph, did not have a great deal of choice in the matter. He feared he would lose 
his power if he did not agree with the Allied forces. For a long time groups of 
opposition and the army were discontented with his rule. He was afraid that some 
opposition groups would form a new government and seize power. The signed Treaty of 
Sevres however was never executed, as the Turkish people did not accept this. The 
opposition, who indeed formed a new government in Ankara, immediately decided to 
start a war of independence against the Greeks, who were occupying the share of 
Western Anatolia that had been promised to them earlier
During the last period of his reign the Sultan did not have the power to negotiate with, 
or stop the Allies. “The Sultan was kept in the custody of the Allies to ensure the 
cooperation of an Ottoman administration.” 11 The opposition who founded the
9 (2) Zürcher,  E.J. p; 179-180
111 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 192-193
"  h t in : / /counirvstudies .us/ turkev/  13.htm
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government in Ankara, mentioned above, became famous as the Young Turks. Their 
seizing of power would usher in a completely new era for the country. This group of 
Young Turks is currently described by Zürcher as “rebels attacking an established 
order” 12 but at the time the Young Turks were emergent they “strove for the
13regeneration of the Ottoman Empire” . ' The Young Turks wanted to restore the values 
and the rule as it had been decided after 1876. Because the Sultan became increasingly 
autocratic the constitutional and parliamentary rules of 1876 were slowly abandoned. In 
fact the Sultan “ ... became so despotic that liberal opposition arose under the leadership 
of the Young Turks, many of whom were forced to flee to Europe to escape his 
policy.” 14
The Young Turks were a group of young students who founded the Ittihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti, (ITC, the Committee of Union and Progress.) in 1889. Their main concern 
was that the Ottoman Empire was torn apart by separatist minority nationalism. This 
disastrous development could be avoided by the ideal of the “Unity of the (ethnic and 
religious) Elements” (Ittihadi Anasir). The Young Turks felt that they could achieve 
this by giving all communities a stake in the empire through parliamentary 
representation. It does not fit in the scope of this thesis to point out exactly how the 
precursors of the Young Turks fought their way to an influential position in the 
Ottoman Empire.15 Among other activities, they founded a political party the aim of 
which they wanted to solve the problems of the minorities. In 1908, they took over 
power from Sultan Abn Al-Hamid during the constitutional revolutions, “ .. .a  revolution 
led by the Young Turks forced Abn al-Hamid to restore the parliament and constitution. 
After a few months of constitutional rule, however, a counterrevolutionary effort to 
restore the Sultan's autocracy led the Young Turks to dethrone the Sultan completely in
12 ( I ) Zürcher,  E.J. -  The Young Turks -  Children  o f  the B order lands?  -  University  o f  Leiden, October  
2002
13 ib id
14 http;/ /w w w .tu rk ishnew s.com /D iscoverT urkev /ana to l ia /h istorv.html
15 ( I )  Zürcher,  E.J.
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1909. He was replaced by Mehmed V Rashid, who was only a puppet of those 
controlling the government.16
The Young Turks stayed in power practically till the end of the First World War; the 
ITC was the main player on the political scene. They implemented many new laws; 
secularity and modernism were the operative words. The vast majority of the founders 
were of non Ottoman-Turkish origin, and well aware of the problems caused by living 
in ethnically mixed areas. Most of the Young Turks came from the border areas of the 
Ottoman Empire, including the Balkans or the Caucasus. The majority of them were 
minority Muslims living in non-Muslim communities.17 Their ideas were certainly 
shaped by European influences, which became clearly visible after they took over the 
power in the new republic of Turkey. One of the main members of the Young Turks in 
that period was Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a well respected army officer.
It was clear however, that other parts of the population felt attracted to the ideas of the 
Young Turks. That the Turkish people were willing to fight in their war of 
independence, after the country had suffered severely in the First World War, 
corroborates this fact.
The Young Turks focused, in their negotiations and later on in the war, on the 
declaration of Wilson which states the right of self determination. The declaration 
stated that every people had the right to establish their own country. The effects of the 
Wilson declaration can be found throughout the whole Middle East. Shortly after the 
First World War, Wilson made a blue print for today’s map of the Middle East.
In 1923, after the Turkish so called Freedom War, the army was able to expel the Allied 
army. Finally a new state was established; much smaller than the Ottoman Empire used 
to be, although far bigger than the Allies had in mind when they proposed the Sevres 
treaty. After one year, in July 1924 the treaty of Lausanne was signed. “With this treaty,
16 http :/ /www.turk ishnews.com /D iscoverTiirkev /anato lia /h is to rv .h tm l
17 (1) Zürcher,  E.J.
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the Allies recognized the present-day territory of Turkey.” The signing of the treaty 
both fixed the Turkish borders and caused the international recognition of the 
sovereignty of the new country as the successor state of the former Ottoman Empire.
* * *
With the foundation of this new state the centuries long rule by the Caliph came to an
end on the 1st of March 1924.19 Already in November 1922 the new government had
20“separated the offices of Sultan and Caliph and abolished the former” The Sultan had 
always been the religious leader of the Ottoman Empire; he ruled both as a political and 
religious leader. Mustafa Kemal Pasha became the president of the new Turkey. As a 
former army officer, he became president. Turkey became a secular state from that time, 
and from that moment on the army would see itself as a guardian of secularism. He was 
to receive the name Atatürk, father of Turks in 1934. This change was naturally of big 
importance for the Turks, as they no longer lived in an Islamic Empire and their country 
was much smaller and a secular republic. Atatürk’s leadership is often described as 
being Kemalistic. Even today’s leaders are sometimes described in such a way, to 
compare certain characteristics with Atatürk. Kemalism is based on six pillars; 
republicanism, secularism, populism, nationalism, astaticism and revolutionism. In this 
thesis focus will be on the secularist pillar of Atatürk’s policy.
It is important to remember the fact that with the leadership of Atatürk the Islamic rule 
basically ended in Turkey. The Turkey, as we know it today, has existed only since 29th 
of October 1923. The country suffered heavy losses during the First World War, this 
war served as the proverbial last straw for an Empire in decline. The republic founded 
by Atatürk was the remaining part of the once very powerful and influential Ottoman 
Empire.
18 http:/ /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/13.h tm
19 (2) Zürcher,  E. J.; p. 208-210
2,1 h t tp : / /counlrvs tud ies .us / tu rkev /l3 .h tm
18
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Some important facts, which are noticeable anti-Islamic and pro-secularism about his 
new rule are the following21: We can distinguish three streams:22
• The secularism of the state, educations and law system: the Caliphate was 
abolished. Constitutional amendment, without Islam as the official religion. No 
longer was it allowed to set up religious movements and parties, Islamic schools 
were closed. Topics and ideas for the Friday sermons in mosques were from now 
on given by the state. In order to increase government influence a special ministry 
was given this task, meaning that the government could use the Friday sermon to 
spread their own ideas.
• Attacking religious symbols and replacing them by European ones. Sunday 
replaced Friday as the weekly day off. A new calendar, clock and also the 
principles of last names were introduced. The Latin alphabet was now used instead 
of the Arabic one.
• Hindering of the daily practice of Islam. Atatürk used the mosques for other, 
secular purposes. In 1935 for instance he decided to use an important mosque, Aya 
Sophia, as a museum.23 Discouraging of the use of religious clothes, closing 
monasteries and the Tarrikat order got forbidden. Religious clothing, a loose 
definition, was only discouraged, due to Atatürk’s fear of banning head scarves. 
From 1925 “religious clothing” was forbidden. However, it was up to universities 
or employers to judge which clothes they found acceptable.
These new laws were a strong a sign that the new Turkey was looking for inspiration 
from and connection with Europe instead of other Islamic countries. The special 
ministry Atatürk set up in March 1924 for religious affairs is the Diyanet Isleri 
Baskanligi (Presidency for Religious Affairs) or in short Diyanet. All religious affairs 
were by this means under state control. This had two different outcomes: on one hand 
Islam became more and more a state matter, so in a way Islam was politicized. On the
21 http://  www.a ta tu rk .com /con  tent/view/24/43
22 (2) Zürcher,  p. 234-235
23 ht tp : / /w w w .allabouttu rkev .com /is t  muze.h tm
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other hand, its aim was to reduce (the influence of) Islam in Turkey. Keeping the old 
traditions would have been backward, and would not have fitted into the new modern 
Turkey.24
What followed was the official ban of the Sharia. Atatürk used the Swiss model for 
family law instead of the laws from the Quran. From that time, polygamy was officially 
forbidden in Turkey. However, the transformation of the population did not turn out to 
be that easy.25
The people found all kinds of ways to profess their religion, although religion did not fit 
in Atatürk’s view for the new Turkey. The new Turk was supposed to be secular, 
modern and progressive. Barbarism needed to be replaced, and Islam in the existing 
form did not fit in the new Turkish structure. Atatürk was trying to introduce the so 
called “§agda§ Islam” which can be translated as contemporary Islam.26
Atatürk was not against Islam itself, Atatürk wanted to ban Islamists from organizing 
themselves in any way. As above mentioned, the connection between religion and 
politics was logical for Muslims. Exactly this feature of Islamism was what Atatürk 
wanted to prevent. Regardless, it is disputable whether Atatürk was against Islam or 
only against the open profession of it. Some quotes which try to prove the latter 
statement are:
• The new modern Turk was Muslim; this religion was automatically mentioned in 
the passport. Atatürk did not regard Islam as something which should be banned or 
declared illegal.27
• Atatürk had Quran translated into Turkish. He wanted people to be able to read it,
28and freedom of religion was important to him."
24 (2) Zürcher,  E.J. 234-235
25 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 234
' 6 (1) Yavuz, M.H. -  Isla m ic  p o litic a l iden tity  in Turkey -  New York, 2003; p .48
27 (1) Yavuz, M.H.; p. 47
2I< Howe, H. -  Turkey today, a nation d ivided over  I s lam ’s revival -  Colorado  2000; p. 40
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• According to Atatürk, secularism was a task for the state. Secularism was the
policy trying to stop religious and ethnical difference in the country. His strategy 
was to create this so called New Turk, who was at least not different by his 
religion from the other New Turks.29
To summarize: Atatürk’s measures to ban Islam from the new republic were not 
working as he had in mind. They can be seen as fairly contra productive; Islam did not 
vanish at all from Turkey but rather disappeared underground. As will be discussed 
later on this became fertile ground for the development of extremism. In the West 
secularism is thought to be positive, philosophers had argued that true religion can be 
professed in a better way if it is no longer under state control. The population is better 
able to be religious in its own way. On the other hand, in Islamic societies, secularism is 
often seen as a brutal attack on religion and religious people.30 This was exactly what 
Atatürk was doing; he imposed his citizens to a new secular state and implemented very 
quickly various kinds of changes. This is something to keep in mind, while discussing 
secular politics in a Muslim inhabited country like Turkey.
To be more precise: Atatürk and the other reformers of the early 1920s opted for a 
secular state, they removed religion from the sphere of public policy and restricted it 
exclusively to that of personal morals, behavior, and faith. Although private religious 
rituals and life could still continue, religion and religious organization were excluded 
from public life. The inhabitants however, did not give up their creed, and people found 
all kinds of ways to profess their religion and form their organizations.
At the beginning of Atatürk’s rule, till the 1930’s, it was officially allowed to set up 
political parties. However, the Turkish people were not used to living in a democracy so 
not many parties were founded. The first significant nationwide party, the Cumhuriyet
24 (3) Yavuz, M.H. -  Turkish  Islam  a n d  the secu la r sta te: the G iilen m ovem ent -  FILL IN ; p. xxiii
3(1 Armstrong, K. -  G esch ieden is van een w ere ldgodsd ienst -  London 2001; p .237
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Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People's Party), was organized by Mustafa Kemal Pasha 
in 1923.31
In 1927, the second political movement appeared when the oppressed Kurdish minority
32tried to unite all their organizations into one big one Hoyboun' (Independence) group. 
The Hoyboun did not solidify into a political party, but Atatürk took it as a sign that the 
people were unhappy with the current situation. Although Atatürk did not want any 
form of opposition, his friend Fethi Okyar set up another party, the Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Firkasi (SCF, Free Republican Party) which “was established with the approval of 
Atatürk h im se lf’33 to give the Kurdish people a way to express themselves. When he 
found out that this opposition party became very successful he was very displeased.
After only three years, in 1930, he decided to ban opposition parties again.
Atatürk died in 1938, and Ismet Inönü became his successor. Inönü came from the same 
group as Atatürk did; both had been members of the Young Turks group. “The stability 
of the new republic was made evident by the smoothness of the presidential succession. 
The day after Atatürk's death, the Grand National Assembly elected his chief lieutenant, 
Inönü, president.”34 The new president was a well known politician, as he had been the 
chief negotiator for the Ottoman Empire when the treaty of Lausanne was signed. He 
also served as prime minister under Atatürk so it came as no surprise that he was 
elected as the next president of Turkey. Generally Inönü stayed close to his
35predecessor’s beliefs. His biggest problem was the Second World War which broke 
out shortly after his appointment. He was able to avoid involvement in the war for a 
long period. Inönü concentrated instead on the economic and financial problems his 
country had to cope with. Only in February 1945 did Turkey join the Allied side, as this 
was “a necessary precondition for participation in the Conference on International 
Organization... from which the United Nations (UN) emerged.”36
31 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 210-211
32 h t tp : / /w w w .kurdm edia .com /ar t ic les .asp? id=9949
33 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 223-225
34 ht tp:/ /countrvsl.udies .us/turkev/15.htm
35 (2) Zürcher,  E.J. ; p 231-232
36 http : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/15.h tm
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2.2 Turkey after the Second World W ar, m ultiparty system developed
After the Second World War there were many changes in Turkish politics due to several 
factors. First of all, Atatürk died in 1938, and in the years which followed it became 
clear that his successor Ismet Inönü was more open to sincerely pluralize the politics. 
The second reason was that The United States helped Turkey economically after the war 
and they summoned reforms on the political field.37 Because of the economic aid 
Turkish society itself changed as well. For the first time a new middle class emerged; 
those people wanted to have influence “to promote specific interests... through 
representatives in parliament or through the cabinet...”38 The changing society called 
for reforms; their wish was to be represented in the government, to be allowed to 
express their demands. “This trend resulted primarily from factors such as the advent of 
multiparty politics, economic development and the accompanying expansion of 
opportunity, and improvements in communications.”39 This process was already under 
the surface but the outburst was clear in the 1946 elections.
This all lead to the official introduction of a multi party system. The multiparty system 
in Turkey is characterized by three important points which will be explained before 
looking at the details.
• Guardianship of power by the army. In Turkey three coup d ’etats took place; in 
1960, 1971 and 1980. Another so called “soft” coup happened in 1997.40 The army 
took over power in these cases; they defended their actions by arguing that it was 
their task to protect Atatürk’s secular republic41. A major role of the armed forces 
was to act as guardian of the constitution and directly against the political Islam.42
• Many parties have been founded, merged, dissolved or outlawed after a military 
coup. This kind of game we can see often in the Turkish political scene: People are
17 W etenschappeli jke  raad voor het reger ingsbele id  (W RR) -  De E uropese Unie, Turkije en de Islam  -
A m sterdam  2004; p. 101
' 8 ht tp : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/85.h tm  
w http : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/85.h tm
40 W W R ; p. 89
41 Howe, M.; p. 134
42 W W R; p. 106
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party members, the party is banned and the same leaders set up another party a few 
years later. Generally the new founded party is less extreme, more moderate, or at 
least claims to be so. In the framework of this thesis I will not go into detail to all 
of the Turkish political parties in the complex years of the 1960’s and 1970’s. The 
history shows many parties, fusions and divisions. The whole spectrum has been 
represented by many parties. In the 75 years between 1923 and 1998, Turkey 
witnessed the existence of not less than 57 governments; it is of course impossible 
to mention them all.
• Among those parties had always been Islamic based ones, main players who keep 
on finding new parties, after bans and dissolutions. Because the main focus of my 
thesis is on the Islamic parties, they will be discussed more extensively. It will be 
pointed out that the Islamist movement appeared in many forms, under many 
names and never lost their influence although the army tried to ban them time after 
time.
In the beginning of the multi party system the CHP was trying to lose their strong 
connections with strict secularism.43 All the other parties which were founded tried to 
stress the fact that they were against the strict Kemalist principles. In the period 
between 1945 and 1950, not less than 24 new political parties were founded. All of 
them had as their main goal to weaken the secularist policies.
Directly after the war Adnan Menderes founded the Demokrat Parti (DP, Democratic 
Party). Menderes was a former member of Atatürk’s party, but he had left the party 
earlier because of internal disputes. The DP would become the most successful party. In 
the first free elections, in 1946, the DP received almost 15% of votes in the elections; 
they did this of course at the cost of the CHP.44 The DP was, among other things, 
advocating for more freedom and respect for Islam. Due to their success it became 
again permitted to make the hajj (Islamic pilgrimage, one of the five obliged to fulfill
43 (2) Zürcher,  E.J. p; 278-288
44 hltn://coLinlrvsUidies.us/turkev/ I5.htm
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for Muslims) to Mecca. Furthermore religious education as reintroduced as a mandatory 
subject at secondary schools. The mosques were allowed to do their prayer call in 
Arabic45 and so on. In the 1950 elections 80% of the Turks voted for the DP, the CHP 
leaders reacted by criticizing the DP for having ties with “informal religious 
networks”46 The DP continued their struggle for more religious freedom; and for the 
first time the fear for Islamism was visible in Turkish politics. The secular CHP was 
afraid of losing its monopoly; it was certainly not the aim of holding free elections that 
their own party would lose influence and the majority of votes.
In the 1960’s “the inability of the two main political parties to cooperate in the 
assembly brought the parliamentary process to a standstill as months passed.”47 The 
economy was in very bad condition, many people lost their jobs and unemployment 
rates rose. After a couple of months the army staged a coupe d ’etat. The new 
government was comprised mainly of the army officers who were involved in the coup. 
In 1960, the trial of a few hundred former government officials and DP party members 
took place. Most of them were found guilty, and fifteen death sentences were 
pronounced. Partly in response to public appeals for leniency, the death sentences of 
former President Bayar and eleven others were commuted to life imprisonment, but 
Menderes and two former cabinet ministers were hanged.48
As said, the beginning of the multiparty system in Turkey was not that easy. At the end 
of Atatürk’s leadership it was forbidden to find opposition parties. The period 
immediately after the Second World War saw many parties emerging. A restless period 
followed, in which the DP took over power from CHP. This DP influence ended when 
the army stole power in 1960. By 1960 the army was already deeply involved in 
political affairs because of the government's use of martial law to enforce its policies.
45 W W R; p. 101, 102
46 (1) Yavuz, M.H. ; p. 61
47 h l tp : / /coun trvs tud ies .us / tu rkey /15.htm
48 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 312-313
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“The senior command concluded that the government had departed from Kemalist 
principles and that the republic was in imminent danger of disintegration.”49 
In 1960 the army was backed by CHP and the media, due to economic crisis and 
corruption within the DP the army revolted and DP was overthrown.
From 1961 on, after a new constitution, the Islamists were given more freedom. A new 
more liberal constitution came into force, but that did not assured that more Islamic 
parties were founded. The government had a new idea: trying to bring the Islamist 
radical movements to a standstill, by giving them a bit of what they wanted. More 
attention was paid to religious education; mosques were built and so on. Of course these 
mosques and schools were still under control of the Diyanet.
Afterwards, secretly and later on openly, new political parties were founded. Naturally 
Islamic based ones were among them. The Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party) was the 
first political party used by “semi urbanized and rural Muslims”50 to express openly 
their wishes at the religious spectrum after the first military coup. The AP, which is 
“generally recognized as the heir of the DP”51 had troubles forming a government after 
the 1961 elections. While the AP was trying to form a coalition government with CHP 
they kept on struggling about the amnesty for the former DP members who were found 
guilty in the big 1960 trial. This issue was finally solved, most of the prisoners were 
given amnesty and the AP became more and more popular. After the 1965 elections 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was able to form a one-party government with his 
AP. This situation lasted till another new military coup was staged in 1971.
At the same time the suppression began: As early as 1967 and 1973 leaders of Islamic 
Parties were imprisoned for attempting “to bring the Islamic State Constitution to
44 http:/ /coimtrvstudies .us/ turkev/  15.htm
50 (2) Yavuz, M.H.; p. 66
51 h t tp : / /cournrvstud ies .us / tu rkev /l5 .h tm
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Turkey”” . The Adalet Partisi and CHP were alternately in power, the AP claiming to 
be the successor of the DP after the ban which followed the 1960 coup.
The AP was a party which “promoted tolerance of the open expression of the traditional 
Islam”53 and this appealed to many people apparently as they won the elections in 1965 
with a large majority.
From 1973 to 1980, between the second and third military coups, the country had a 
series of weak coalition governments that were unable to handle increasingly serious 
economic problems and political violence.54 The power was alternating between the AP 
and the CHP but neither of them was able to solve Turkey’s problems. The declining 
economy was the biggest worry for both parties.
In 1980 the AP was banned, followed after another military coup. After the 1980 coup 
all other political parties were banned as well, and this lasted until 1987. A P’s leader 
Erbakan and 21 other party members were accused of “mingling politics and religion 5”
52
52 Karmon, E. -  “ Islamic Terror is t  activit ies in Turkey in the 1990s” -  Terror ism  and Political  Violence, 
winter 1998; p. 102
51 h t tp : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/15.h tm
54 http : / /w ww.iurk ishnews.com /D iscoverTurkev/anato l ia /h is to rv .h tn il
55 (2) Zürcher, E.J. p. 352
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2.3 Turkey’s last elections, political reforms
This confusing period in the 1960’and 1970’s in Turkey has stabilized in recent years.
In 1982, the voters approved a new constitution, which established an authoritarian 
presidential system and installed Kenan Evren as president for a seven-year period.56 
Evren had been the leader of the military coup. Demirel, Ecevit, and other former 
political leaders were excluded from participation at that time. Elections for the 
National Assembly were held in November 1983. Turgut Özal first became Prime 
Minister and later on President in 1989. He suddenly died in 1993, former president 
Demirel -and at that time Prime Minister- succeeded him as president. Özal had been an 
important politician for the Islamic case; that is why he needs to be briefly mentioned 
before heading to the recent politics in Turkey. Özal was the first politician who started 
the process towards the acceptance of Islamism.57 Because it was clear the Islamists had 
big support in Turkey it was decided that “£agdas Islam”, this new state Islam, had to 
be promoted rather than secularism. It was spread around by the Diyanet. Özal actually 
wanted to support the non official Islam, not connected with Diyanet, to take the wind 
out of the sails of the more radical Islamists. Islam was now used as an ideological
CO
weapon of the army in fact.
Özal gave the Diyanet a task to create solidarity and unification of the people. Under his 
reign the number of mosques rose and religious education became a mandatory subject 
at school. More Islamic publications, movements and groups appeared. Turkey tried to 
strengthen ties with other Islamic countries on the international level as well.
Because this thesis focuses on the recent developments in Turkish politics a step 
forward will be made to the last two governmental elections. The elections in 1999 were 
held after the so called “soft coup” in 1997. On the 28lh of February the army launched 
a campaign in which Irtica (Islamist fundamentalism) was pointed out as the biggest
56 hllp:/ /w w w .lurkishnew s.com /D iscoverTurkev/ana to lia /h is lorv .h lrn l
57 (2) Zürcher.  E.J.;  p. 365-67
58 (2) Zürcher.  E.J.;  p. 365-67
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danger of Turkey.59 I decided to only give an overview of the biggest parties, and a 
small Islamic based party which was new in the 2002 elections. For example, 21 parties 
joined the elections in 1999, which is far too much to discuss here.60 
A short graphical overview of the last two elections and the abbreviations of the several 
parties will make things more clear.61
Figure 1: last two elections in Turkey.
Elections Turkey
AKP CHP DYP МНР ANAP DSP FP SP rest
• Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party)
• Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party)
• Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, True Path Party)
• Milliyet^i Hareket Partisi (МНР, National Movement Party)
• Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party)
• Demokrati к Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left Party)
• Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party)
• Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party)
59 W W R; p. 89
60 http : / /w ww.belgenet .ne t /avrin ti .php7vil  id= 13
61 Information taken from http : / /w ww.belgenet .ne t /avrin ti .php7vil  id= 13. and 
h ttp : / /w ww.n tvm snhc .com /m odu les /sec im 2002 /genel .a sp  the graph I made m yself
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The three biggest parties after the elections in 1999 were the DSP (22%), МНР (18%) 
and the FP (15%). These parties will be discussed later, with a focus on the FP, being 
the only Islamist party out of that three.
After 2002, the big winner was the AKP (34%) with CHP as the second biggest party 
with 19% of the votes. We can assume that the election reflects that the society is split; 
the struggle between the Islamists and the secularists is visible in the voting results.
As can be seen in the table above the newly created Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, 
Justice and Development party) gained the most votes. This is an interesting result, and 
because the key focal point of my thesis is on the currently ruling party I will discuss 
them last.
Surprisingly in the 1999 elections the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left 
Party) lost a lot of votes. They went from being the biggest party, to only receiving 1% 
of the votes.
DSP is the party which was lead by Bülent Ecevit. Blilent Ecevit was the former leader 
of the CHP, after Inönü had died, from 1973 until 1980. Like many of his colleagues, he 
is a controversial person. He was banned from political life after the military coup in 
1980 but he came back to politics in 1987. This was in fact not that special; after 1980, 
all political parties were banned and it took seven years before the parties were allowed 
again. Ecevet’s wife had founded the DSP in the meantime and he took over the 
presidency, after a referendum which was held to let him enter politics, again.62 The 
party was not successful at first but in 1998 they received enough votes to become a 
minority party in the government. Due to the fact the government toppled in 1998,
Ecevit was appointed to make a minority government to lead the country to the new 
elections in 1999. In this period, under Ecevit leadership the Partiya Karkerěn Kurdistan 
(PKK, Kurdish Workers Party) leader Abdullah Öcalan was taken into custody. The 
capture of this radical Kurdish nationalist gave the DSP an enormous boost and was the 
explanation for them achieving almost a quarter of the votes in 1999 elections. “Tension,
62 http : / /w ww.belgenet .ne l /avrin li .php7vil  id= 13
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economic crisis and conflicts both in the government and inside the DSP reached a peak 
in 2 001.”63 Unfortunately the DSP was not able to solve the problems. This all led to 
the “resignation of the government”64 and the newly held elections.
With 18% of the votes in 1999, to 8 % in 2002, the Milliyetgi Hareket Partisi (МНР, 
National Movement Party) lost quite a few of their voters. The МНР is without a doubt 
highly nationalistic and “labeled by some as fascist.”65 The МНР is “essentially 
secularist, the МНР nonetheless regarded Islam as one of the pillars of the Turkish 
state” . In the framework of this thesis it is not possible to go into much detail but 
Turkey suffered greatly from terror attacks in the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, it is 
necessary to mention shortly that many of these “violence-prone groups of the right 
were apparently attached, directly or indirectly to the М НР.”66 The best organized of 
these, the Grey Wolves, were armed and regularly resorted to terrorist tactics. The МНР 
takes a special place in the Islamist movement in Turkey, as it is known that “some 
members of the right-wing Nationalist Movement converted to Islam.”67 (WHAT TO 
DO WITH THAT?)
The third biggest party, Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) which had 15% of the votes in 
1999 was declared illegal in June 2001. It was the successor party of Refah Partisi (RP) 
which had been banned in February 1998. Both parties had leaders who had been 
influential in the earlier described AK. Those parties were without any doubt based on 
Islam.
* * *
63 h t tp : / /www.bclgenet .net /avrin ti .php7vil  id= 13
64 h t tp : / /www.belgenet .net /avrin ti .php7vil  id= 13
65 http : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/15.h tm
66 http : / /countrvstudies .us/ turkev/16.h tm
67 Karmon, E.
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The special feature of the Turkish Islamist parties is the fact that they are “fully 
integrated in the Turkish pluralist system”68. For that reason the more violent and 
extreme groups have a more marginal position; their goals are, at least partly, 
represented by the RP or FP. The RP is seen as “the Islamic movement's leading 
political force.”69 For this thesis we can assume the FP as the successor as well in this 
respect. The question is now whether the RP and the FP, were legitimate democratic 
parties or if they were only misusing the pluralist party system in order to install an 
Islamic-based state in Turkey. As said the RP was outlawed in 1998, the reason for this 
was “real threat for the regime, although the sentence was based on political and 
legalistic grounds and not... the violent or terrorist radical activity”70. The biggest 
difference with the Islamist groups in other countries can be found in the fact that the 
Turkish Islamist parties are integrated in the political system. The leaders can be elected, 
become mayor, take place in the government. Their expanding influence and growing 
popularity is watched closely by the army. Also the Constitutional Court in the latest 
years made some attempts to stop the Islamic based parties from strengthening their 
power in Turkish political arena. “No serious terror acts were perpetrated by Islamic 
groups” in Turkey from the moment RP had their electoral success till the moment the 
government was forced to resign. After resigning from the RP government most RP 
leaders were absorbed in the FP, which had further success in the elections by receiving 
15% of the votes.
Why those parties were declared illegal in Turkey? The RP “is one of the main avenues
71for political Islam to articulate its demand in public space” and this coalition shows 
the duality in Turkish identity. 1996 was a historical moment; it was the first time in the 
Republic’s history that the prime minister had a political philosophy based on Islam.
The RP became as well popular due to the fact they improved social services as 




71 (2) Yavuz; p .63
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In the 2002 elections we find the return of the CHP, Atatürk’s party, with a good 
election result. For a long period they were not represented in government anymore, and 
a couple of times the party did not even make it to the threshold. Many DSP voters were 
behind them, because they were disappointed by the result of the DSP government and 
they turned back again to the CHP. The CHP had many troubles following the afore 
mentioned ban after the army seized power in 1980. Another reason for their success is 
the fact that CHP was always Atatürk’s party. People suppose the party is the protector 
from secularism and many voters used this assumption as a dissenting vote against the 
AKP. The temporary struggle in Turkey is between the Islamic and secular parties.72 
In the last elections the Turks voted differently. In the last years there has always been a 
steady support for Islamic based parties on one hand and a more liberal, secular part on 
the other side of the political spectrum.
A small party which first appeared in the 2002 elections is the Saadet Partisi (SP, 
Felicity Party) The more radical members of the former FP and RP set up the SP which, 
as a newcomer in last elections got only 2,5%. The SP did not receive many votes, but 
as it is the party which is following the more strict line of Islam, with the FP and RP as 
predecessor it should be given attention as well in my thesis. The chairman of the SP is 
Recai Kutan. He used to be deputy chairman of MSP, deputy chairman of Refah Partisi 
and chairman of Fazilet Partisi. After this party was closed down he became the SP
73chairman. This is a proof that this is the way it works in Turkey. The one party gets 
banned and the next one is founded by the same people. Just to illustrate their ideas 
with one example: they don’t agree with the fact that children are hindered to study 
Koran. “ It should be allowed from five years old, not twelve. The moral and national 
values are in decline and Milli Görü$ is the solution.”74
72 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p .375-80
73 h t tp : / /w w w .saadetpar t is i .o rg . tr /page .asp? id=146
74 h ttp : / /w ww.m ill igazc te .com .lr  - Kutan: £ a r e  Milli  Görü§’te -  1 l lh July 2005
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For the main question in this thesis, it is important to look closely to the 2002 winner of 
the elections. The center of attention is to see if the AKP has an Islamic agenda. I want 
to prove, that although they argue differently the AKP has an Islamic program. The fact 
that there is no ban on the AKP could be explained by fear of the National Security 
Council. Although they banned two previous parties with Islamic orientations, the 
National Security Council could not take on the AKP because of its huge popular 
mandate.7S
Why is the AKP so popular, and still ruling? What is their party program and the actual 
policy they follow?
On their website76 an English language party program can be found. Not many 
references to religion are written there.
•  Our Party  constitu tes  a ground where  the unity and the integrity o f  the Republic o f  Turkey, the 
secular ,  democratic ,  social  State  o f  law, and the processes o f  civil ianization, democrat izat ion , 
freedom of  be l ie f  and equality  o f  opportunity  are considered  essential.
•  O ur  Party em braces without discrim ination , all o f  our cit izens,  regardless o f  their sex, ethnic 
origins, beliefs and opinion.
•  Basically , secularism is a principle  which allows people  o f  all religions, and beliefs to
com fortably  practice  their  religions, to be able to express their  religious convic t ions and live
accordingly,  but which also allows people  without beliefs  to organize  their  lives along these  lines.
From this point of  view, secularism  is a principle  o f  f reedom  and social  peace.
•  It is also unacceptable  to make use o f  religion for polit ica l,  econom ic  and o ther interests,  or to put 
pressure  on people  who think and live d ifferently  by using religion.
• It also re jects the interpretation and distortion o f  secularism  as enm ity  against  religion
But as well:
• Our  Party a ttributes a special importance to Turkey 's  re lation with Islamic countr ies.
•  M ay Allah  be the be loved and assis tant o f  our nation?
•  Everyth ing will be better  with us, with the help  o f  Allah.
75 (2) Zürcher, E.J.; p. 423-24
76 w w w .akparti .o re .t r
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This is actually only how the party program of AKP looks. After four years of 
government some result can be seen, the actual measures the AKP has taken.
Some policies Erdogan has carried out in the last few years I would like to show for the 
purpose of my thesis:77
Erdogan himself had been educated in an Imam Hatip (religious academy school) and 
he is a big supporter of these kinds of schools. He realizes that transforming a society 
starts with education so the AKP put a lot of effort of changing the school system.
When Erdogan was still mayor of Istanbul he said that he would transform all schools
78into Imam Hatip ones but he reconsidered this statement. He changed the educational 
system in such a way that also graduates from the Islamic schools can enter the 
university, which wasn’t the case before. In this way, students without any Western 
Fundamental knowledge can enter normal university and apply for all kinds of jobs 
which were not within their reach before. In accession talks with the European Union 
Erdogan also insisted on removing a reference in which the Turkish educational system
79was described as secular.
Two other examples I want to mention: Alcohol is banned in public restaurants in areas 
where the AKP won the municipal elections. Erdogan was able to also carry out this law
in Istanbul, when he was mayor there. The attitude towards the Quran is tested among
80Turkish Airline employees as well. The time in which Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul 
is very interesting, after this period he declared on several occasions that he has 
changed. Being the prime minister he says that he is no longer in favor of the political 
Islam but it is assumed that this is only a strategic change.81
77 (2) Rubin, M. -  Mr. Erdogan 's  Turkey -  W all Street Journal O c tober  2006




81 Wynia, S. “ Turkije  w olf  in Schaapsk le ren” -  E lsevier  M arch  2006 
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2.4 The main players in the Turkish Islam ist stream
One of the most well known and controversial political leader of the last decades was 
Necmettin Erbakan. It is needed to go into the history a little again.
Shortly after the coup in 1971, new elections were held. A newcomer at that time was 
the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Movement Party) led by Necmettin Erbakan, 
who had been leader of the proscribed Milli Nizam Partisi.82 (MNP, National Order 
Party). The MNP only existed for one year; it was founded and banned in 1971. The 
MSP was regarded as a revival of the MNP under a new name. “The principal plank in 
the MSP's platform was the restoration of Islamic law and practice in Turkey.”83 
The MSP was the “first republican party to espouse openly Islamic principles 
inaugurated the politicization of the religious issue”84 The Turkish society underwent a 
lot of social changes during the 1960’s and 1970’s; economical decline and massive 
emigration.
So, in the 1970’s Erbakan’s Islamist movement’s goal was among other things to 
develop educated counter-elite by strengthening the Islamic stream in the educational
oc
system.
As discussed before, thanks to “clashes between the left and right“86 and the ever 
returning guardianship of the army to protect Atatürk’s state, a coup was staged again. 
The MSP was outlawed and all politicians were banned from political life for 10 years.
During the pos t-1980 coup period, governments perceived Islamic education as a 
panacea against extremist ideologies. Still, lots of people felt attracted to the Islamist 
movement and the Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) was set up in 1983. It did not 
obtain a legal status until 1987, when the ten year political ban was lifted after seven 
years. The RP became successful because they played “a key role in the political
82 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 326
83 ht tp : / /countrvsiudies .us/ lurkev/16.h tm
84 http : / /countrvstud ies .us/ tu rkey/85.htm
85 Narli, N. -  “The rise o f  the Islamist m ovem ent in Turkey” -  M eria  Journa l ,  Sep tem ber  1999 
(h t tp : / /w w w .b iu .ac . i l /SO C /besa /m eria / iourna l/ l  9 9 9 / is sue3 /iv3n3a4 .h tm ll
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socialization of the Islamic group by mobilizing them” . They brought them to the 
polls and mobilized in this way the Islamic orientated periphery.
Who are the people voting for the Islamists this time? The socio-economic background,
political aims, and interests of those supporting the Islamist movement are very
.• 88 diverse.
• University population, especially upwardly mobile youth who must compete with 
the established urban middle and upper-middle classes
• Unskilled young urban people, who suffer from high unemployment
• Some from the state-employed bourgeoisie, bearing falling real wages and high 
inflation, particularly since the early 1990s.
• In Anatolia, there are also sectors of ultra-nationalists who have embraced Islamist
attitudes and a sizeable number of religiously conservative Kurds who assume that
89an Islamic order could possibly bring solutions to the conflict in their region.
The RP, which became very successful only after 1994, became popular thanks to their 
improvements of public services and the reduction of corruption.90 
However, the seemingly success of the RP came to an end caused by several factors: 
The people in Turkey were disappointed by the Islamist anti-democratic position on 
several issues. Erbakan for example made critical and insulting comments about people 
who took part in the "One Minute of Darkness for Enlightenment" civil protest in 
February 1997.91 R P’s support for constitutional changes caused some worry that it was 
trying to dilute the secular state. Women were as well worried about the reduction of 
their rights. The party's allegiance to democracy was also called into question. Finally, 
there were allegations that the Refah Party had connections with more militant Islamist 
groups. Altogether this resulted in the escalation of tensions between the military and
87





91 Narli,  N.
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the RP and also the antagonism between the Islamists and secular public opinion. This 
provided a legitimate framework to bring RP to court in May 1997.92 
This was after the successful campaign against Irtica by the army, which was mentioned 
earlier. This soft coup is very important for Islamism in Turkey, as it forced Erbakan to 
take measures and implement laws which were set up against Islamism. The mandatory 
primary education was extended to eight years, instead of five, assuring that their
93children were not sent to Islamic schools after five years.
After this soft coup, in December 1997, the new Fazilet Party was founded by 33 former 
RP deputies. At that time it had 144 seats in the parliament which it had obtained as a 
result of the switchover of the RP deputies. The party's conservative wing controlled by 
Erbakan elected the parliamentary group leaders before the reformist wing, led by 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had the chance to do so.94
Along with renewing its membership, the FP has tried to rectify its image as anti­
women and undemocratic. They did not mention the old rhetoric "Islamic mission" 
anymore, but they emphasized on democracy, human rights, and personal liberty. They 
as well started to support for Turkey's EU membership, a step the RP had opposed for 
three decades. The last big change was that the RP always strongly recommended its 
supporters to have the Islamic dress but the FP appointed two women without any head 
coverings to its Central Decision making Board. From this point of view the FP looks 
very progressive, but Erbakan's also had another policy towards Islamic terrorist groups. 
This policy was visible by hosting representatives from the radical Islamist including 
the Palestinian Hamas or Egypt's Muslim Brothers while he was Premier, till the end of 
1997. After the FP was outlawed the AKP was founded, and headed by Erdogan after he 
was released from prison. Erbakan at the moment is an old man; he does not have any 
official public function. In 2003 he was sentenced for forging financial documents in 
his RP.
92 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 380-82
93 W W R; p. 90
94 Narli, N.
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In a Dutch weekly magazine Erbakan is described as “the founding father of a serial of 
parties which had as central goal to end the secular character of the Turkish state.”95 
Still at the moment, it is important to see what his ideas were, because he was not the 
only one convinced by those thoughts. In the Middle East Journal96 an article was 
dedicated to the goals of Erbakan. The article was written in 1997, so it mainly focuses 
on the Refah Party but the main political ideas are not likely to alter much, so a 
summary of the ideas are needed for this thesis. The main question in the article is 
whether the RP is honest about their claim that they are secular and democratic. The 
author doubts this, as the RP has many aspects of an Islamist party.
The proposed “adil düzen” (translated as Just Order) consist of two parts. One part is 
the economic one; Just Economic Order. This new order is meant to be a third way 
between capitalism and communism. Experts and party members claim that Islam offers 
the best economic system. The basic principle is the “the absolute harmony of economic 
interests among Muslims and the state's duty to manage the economy”97 It would solve 
all problems Turkey is facing and in one generation time Turkey would be a leading 
economic power. The second part is the Legal Pluralism.98 In this model several law 
systems would work next to each other, and the different systems are divided along 
religious lines. Inhabitants can choose to belong to the Islamic law system in this case. 
Refah ideologues believe that the legal structures of pre-modern Muslim states, 
including the Ottoman Empire supported legal pluralism.
However, it has been proved to be unpractical and experiences with it proved that the 
system is inadequate, the same about the Just Economic Order; “It suffers heavily from 
logical and factual contradictions.”99 Refah's economical ideas are only a dream, and 
can never be reached is the conclusion of the article.
45 Wynia, S.
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Erbakan founded the АКР, which is together with the SP the successor party of the 
Fazilet Party. The AKP represents a more moderate stream than the SP. The AKP 
reformers made this choice to attract more voters, and to reduce their chances of a ban 
from the army. 100
* * *
Erbakan’s supposed successor is Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He is the present prime 
minister of Turkey. The position he held before was mayor of Istanbul, where he was a 
very popular politician. It is important to stress some of his intended laws during his 
Istanbul time, although this was fifteen years ago and did not all make it into force. It 
shows they are typical Islamist proposals: He intended to separate the boys from the 
girls in school busses, and as well as dividing beaches for women and men. The law 
which did pass was the ban on alcohol in restaurants.101 In some more recent speeches 
Erdogan distanced himself from those radical ideas.
Serious problems started in December 1997 when he cited a well known poem 102 which 
he called believers our soldiers and minarets our bayonets. He was convicted for 
inciting religious hatred for this reason. After he served ten months in prison his FP was 
banned.
After his stay in prison, Erdogan set up a new political party, which is the now ruling 
AKP. The AKP is often abbreviated as AK partisi as the word “ak” is Turkish means 
white, so it gives a positive sense to the party’s name. On the AKP website this is as
103 • . . .well used. Of course it was a big problem for Erdogan to become prime minister, as
a convicted person. His friend Abdullah Gül, a fervent supporter, was his stand in and
he pushed through a new amendment to let Erdogan be appointed anyway.
"Kl W W R ; p. 106
101 W ynia ,  S.
1(12 The poem, Asker Duasi  (Prayer of the Soldier) is written by Z iya Gökalp,  a secular  nationalist  poet
103 http:/ /www.akDarti .org.tr/
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Some old statements and ideas of Erdogan had been discussed, but some new speeches 
are interesting as well. After the big disturbance with the so called Mohammed cartoons 
Erdogan made himself known as some speech man of Islamic world. He told that the 
cartoons were “an attack on our spiritual beliefs” . After Hamas took over power in 
Palestine, the European countries did not want to keep up diplomatic relations and 
stopped all financial assistance. It was very surprisingly that Erdogan invited this 
Islamic based political party a few weeks after they had formed the government.104 
It was the actually the same thing that Erbakan did. Immediately after he came to power 
a few of the first countries he visited were Iran and Libya.105 He did not have much 
freedom, as he had his coalition, to cut ties of with other countries but these visits can 
be seen as symbolic.
Recai Kutan, the chairman of Saadet is the last one to mention; as he is derived from the 
RP and FP. Kutan’s party did not receive many votes during the last elections, but they 
are considered as the most Islamist party Turkey has now. “The SP as “real” Islamists” 
even lost many votes in their former power bases.106
“Secularism can never be used as a pretext for atheism or as a weapon against 
religion.” 107
104 Wynia, S.
105 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 419
106 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; p. 388
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2.5 Recently Islam ist gets more support in Turkey
The AKP says they are not an Islamic based party, but this is not always observable 
from their steps. In the previous chapter some of the ideas the RP and FP had are 
pointed out. The AKP, as its heir, has also taken steps which are at least pro Islamism. 
What does it mean to be Islamic as a political party? It is hard to compare with for 
example the Christian based parties in Europe, although in Turkey as well religion and 
state are separated. Islam, in contrast with Christianity, is a complete system, directing 
all aspects in life. For the Classical Islam the split between church and state is 
impossible.
In particular, when the Muslims are having a hard time their religion is something they 
usually fall back on. The politicians and Islamic activists know this and they promote 
Islam as “a political, social, economic and spiritual embodiment of the solution” 108 
This trend was visible during last century. In general, in hard economic times religion is 
something people rely on, rather than their government. For example, this message had 
been preached by the Muslim Brotherhood. Islam would be the solution for all 
economic and political problems. The Islamists have been trying to win the hearts of the 
people by giving them social assistance. Schools and food kitchens can be found around 
the mosques.
In this thesis there is no space to go into details of every aspect of Islam. One important 
feature of the political Islam that will be discussed is the Islamic keyword tawhid 
(unity). Tawhid stands for the inseparableness of religion and state. This is an important 
feature, because as said: In the ideal Islamic state the leader is the Caliph, he is the 
political and religious leader in one person. In order to reach the Islamic state Islamists 
usually want to reintroduce the rule by a Caliph. The Caliph was historically always 
selected by a committee; he holds this title which claims for him temporal and spiritual
108 (2) Zürcher,  E.J.; 0. 387-88 
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authority over all M uslims.109 The last Caliph so far ruled in the Ottoman Empire till
Atatürk came to power in 1924 and installed a secular government.
Why is the Islamist stream more popular now? Not only in Turkey but as well in other
countries this growth is visible. Six causes for the impressive growth of the Islamist are
the following:110
• The fall of communism left an empty place in the political scene. On the left scene 
many intellectuals are looking for an alternative, and they are attracted by Islamist 
ideas. Islamism is the “the voice of hopelessness” 111
• Modernization. A pattern is visible, the more modern a Middle Eastern state is, the 
stronger a revival of Islamism can be seen. Being a modem state it is not 
surprisingly that an Islamic revival in Turkey is visible.
• The highly questionable form of secularism practiced in Turkey contributed to the 
religious revival, and so to Refah's growth. Because Muslims do not receive 
enough freedom to confess their creed they want the RP, or the other Islamist 
parties, to protect them from any form of oppression.112
• The Islamists usually have the best organized parties in Turkey, this it what other 
parties lack: a good organized leadership. They visit people at home and provide 
for members (and sometimes potential members) basic needs. Islamists are 
representing a huge social movement and the faction is evidently highly visible in 
the whole country.
• Other parties were heavily suffering under corruption in the 1990’s, the people are 
fed up with that and are looking for justice. They hope to find this in Islamism.1 u
• The political parties at the right of the spectrum lost their identity. After the end of 
Demirel’s leadership the parties lost their position as leading force behind
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democracy. Center right lost 22% of votes in twelve years and the extreme right, 
as well as the left parties raised their share of course.
In the 1990’s in Turkey a heavy decline was visible: corrupt leaders, bad economic 
situation. They turned for this reason back to their roots, the Islamic period. Big 
migration waves occurred in the 1990’s towards the cities, the poor people were helped 
by several social Islamist organizations, and it was “logical that they would follow the 
election advice” of those Islamic movements.114
To what extent is the AKP an Islamist one? Are they really dreaming about the next 
Caliph instead of a democratic leader? Because many people assume that the AKP 
wants to reach a more Islamic state, it is important to make clear what that would mean. 
Maybe those parties are even using the democratic way to finally reach the perfect 
Islamic state, so it is important to see what their ideas are on the Islamic state, and how 
it can be reached and so on.
For instance, Erdogan said in his Istanbul time: “Thank God Almighty, I am a servant 
of the Shariah” 115 and he had another statement around 1996, which was cynical but 
might contain some kind of wish: “Democracy is like a streetcar, you ride it until you 
arrive at your destination and then you step off.” 116
The AKP in Turkey claims not be a political party with a religious axis but many of 
their voters don’t agree with this. Voters choose for the AKP as they believe this party 
is the one most Islamic based. Recently the AK party got a lot of negative publicity in 
non-Islamic countries because they did not allow showing the children’s cartoon Winnie 
the Pooh anymore. One of the most important characters in the show is a pig, which is 
regarded as an unclean animal. The AKP Prime Minister Erdogan “the offshoot of a
114 W W R ; p. 106
115 (2) Rubin, M. -  Mr. Erdogan 's  Turkey  -  Wall Street Journal  O c tober  2006 
h ttp : / /w ww.m eforum .org /ar t ic le /1036
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now-banned Islamist movement” was under fire for seeking to raise the profile of Islam 
in mainly Muslim but strictly secular Turkey. 117
Sivan wrote in 1997 very skeptically about Islamists group taking over governmental 
power.118 He does not believe it is possible for Islamists to use the democratic way of 
governing. They are hampered by other parties and usually they can’t hold power for a 
long time. “Further supporting the skeptical view... is the Turkish case, where the 
radical Necmettin Erbakan was actually permitted to become prime minister but was 
stymied in every initiative he took and forced out of power within a year of coming to 
power.” 119
To repeat once more why political Islam in Turkey became so popular the latest years: 
The reason can be found in the economically bad situation:120 “The dead end 
economical state of the people, and the oppressing regime assured that the population 
would be driven into the arms of Islamic fundamentalists” and the political Islam would 
be in this case a “stream of despair” In Turkey this is the case; many people got 
disappointed by the bad behavior of the different political parties. Corruption and the 
inability to solve economic problems were the main factors. As seen in many other 
relatively prosperous Islamic countries, Turkey faces a revival of religion. The AKP has 
the advantage that they were a new established party, no bad stigmas around them. 
Erdogan was a popular politician while he was Istanbul’s mayor. The same goes up for 
another well known politician: Abdullah Gül, former RP and FP member. After Gül 
gave up his position as prime minister in favor of Erdogan he is now serving as deputy 
prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs. GUI has Islamist roots as well; he 
started his career at the Islamic Development B ank121.
117 Volkskrant  -  W innie de P ooh zo n d er  K norretje  -  14th O c tober  2006
118 Sivan, E. -  “Why Radical M uslims A ren't Taking over G overnm ents"  -  Middle East Quarterly, December 
1997
119 Sivan, E.
120 ww w .lsp-inas .be/m arx ism e/2004is lam .h tm l
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In this respect I also want to mention an influential Islamic stream, the Nak§ibendi122 
order. This is one of the few religious Tarrikat which survived all bans and restrictions 
in Turkey for almost one century. As said: next to the existence of the Diyanet, which 
represents the official Islam, an unofficial Islam developed. One of those societies is the 
Nak§ibendi: their ideas are mainly focused on the Sharia, the base of religious rules.
This order has the reputation of being strict; they were strongly opposed against
123Atatürk’s reforms. It is interesting to see that as well Ozal as well as Erbakan were 
members of Nak$ibendi groups.124
Some complaints about society of the Nak§ibendi were the downfall of values, the 
growing alcohol consumption, gambling and prostitution. Those developments were, 
according to them, an evolution which was parallel with European developments. The 
order recommended members should live according to Islam, the obligation for politics 
was to promote this good way of living. In my opinion we can find these ideas back in 
the policy of Erbakan, and his follower Erdogan.
W W R ; p. I 1 1, 1 12
123 W W R; p. 1 1 1
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Chapter 3 -  Turkish migration to the Netherlands
3.1 Turkish immigrants to W estern Europe/ the Netherlands
After looking at the Turkish political situation, the main players in the powerful Islamic 
movement and their ideas it is time to examine something else. The Turkish people 
migrated in big numbers to Western Europe, and many people with Turkish roots are 
currently living in Western Europe and the Netherlands. It is important to see why, 
when and how this migration took place. Currently a lot o f  problems are appearing in 
Western European societies connected with those immigrant groups. For my thesis I 
will try to prove that the Turkish minority in the Netherlands is not integrated, and 
therefore maybe highly susceptible to influence from their home country. When this 
group is indeed easily influenced, this can hamper their integration again. It seems like 
a circle: poor integration and therefore prey to influences telling them not to integrate. 
Consequently the Dutch people are afraid they can serve as a lobby group for the 
Turkish politics, and as well for the Turkish Islamists. Also fears are present that the 
Turkish people eventually create their own Islamic based political party and enter the 
Dutch political scene. For this reason it is very significant to see who those people are, 
what their position in Dutch society is and what their political goal is.
First we need to go back to Western Europe, after the Second World War. The European 
economy was for a large part destroyed after this war, but after the Marshall plan helped
the suffering economy it boomed again. The countries needed more workers and the
125first work migrants came sporadically after the Second World War. ‘ The big waves on 
the other hand did not arrive till the 1960’s. Many of the first immigrants came from 
countries as Italy, Portugal and Spain. After people from those countries, also the first 
Turks came.
125 hl ln : / /w ww .acbkenniscen lrum .n l/lu rken  
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Their first recorded arrival was in 1961 in the Netherlands, they were only with 100 
people in total. The next year 300, 1963 was good for 1,200 and in 1964 the number 
rose to 4 ,300.126
In 1964 the Dutch government set up an official agreement with Turkey, like many 
other countries at that time did. A recruitment centre was equipped in Ankara for 
selecting Turkish people to work abroad. In the first wave’s wake friends and family 
members followed, with or without working permit; this was not a problem back then: 
plenty of work was available in the Netherlands. This kind of work migration had a lot 
in common with the seasonal work migration which was common happening in the 
ninetieth century.127
Just as before most employment possibilities were found in the heavy “nasty” jobs, and 
the most Turks ended up again in heavy physical labor in the harbor or other industry. 
The second parallel can be found in the fact that the people who applied for jobs in the 
Netherlands were from the poorer, overpopulated areas with not many chances for a 
good job and better economic prospects. The third aspect was the expectations of the 
Dutch government.128 The expectation was that the immigrants had come temporarily.
In the beginning the Turkish people thought that as well, they saved money for buying a 
house in Turkey, and did not want to integrate much into the Dutch society. Their return 
was more important than settling down in an unknown society. This thinking also 
clarifies why not many guest workers were attending Dutch language courses or made 
an effort to integrate into the society.
From both parties the expectations were that this situation was temporary. A big 
economic boom in Western Europe caused the fact that many workers were needed. 
Huge unemployment numbers in Turkey, uncertain economic prospect existed on the 
other hand. The young Turkish men who left for Europe were expected to earn good 
money in Europe, bring it back to Turkey and this was thought to help the economy.
126 (2) Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) -  B evolkingstrends -  Heerlen,  Autum n 2004; p. 10
127 h t tp : / /w w w .acbkenniscen trum .n l/ tu rken
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Two big differences were important for bringing the situation as it is right now.
Because of mass media like telephones, better transportation possibilities the (emotional) 
distance got smaller, migrant workers asked their family to come over for example. It 
was easier then for the Turkish to settle in the new country for a longer period. The 
Dutch employers were happy with the guest workers; the Dutch after the Second World 
War did not want to do those kinds of jobs the migrants ended up with. Also, in the 
period between the two World Wars the birthrate had been low in the Netherlands and 
this assured that not many new work forces entered the labor market in this period. The 
family reunion process was welcomed; the young people were simply needed to bulk up 
the work force. From the first people who arrived in 1965-66 only about 15% are still 
living in the country, but from people who arrived there from 1972-73 almost half of
129them still live in the Netherlands.
Something to keep in mind as well is the uncertain situation Turkey was in. After 1960, 
when the first military coup was staged many people lost their jobs. Lots of people from 
the countryside migrated to the Turkish cities where “immigrants suffered from 
substandard housing conditions and lack of infrastructure. They constituted a new 
periphery whose members are often economically disadvantaged, culturally 
disintegrated, and politically isolated.” 130
The bad economic situation, connected with the high unemployment rate, was not easy 
to solve and the people who migrated to the Netherlands realized it would be hard to 
find a job in Turkey and they preferred to stay. Turkish officials also thought that 
sending the Turks for work in Europe would be a good idea for solving their own 
internal economic problems. The money they would send home would help to recover 
the Turkish economy. 131
129 (2) C BS; p. 10
13(1 Narl i,  N.
131 Ülger, M. -  Hoe de Turkse  overheid  integratie  tegenwerkt - 
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The Turks who migrated to the Netherlands and other European countries were not 
average. Most of the Turks were between 25 and 39, did not have a good education and 
were coming from the East of Turkey, frequently from smaller villages. At the start of 
the Turkish economic crisis many people from the poorer regions in the east had left 
their region and were looking for a job in the bigger cities. Many of them had found 
their way to Istanbul already, so the migration to Europe was in fact the second step.132 
After 1974, the government decided not to supply any more working permits. The 
motive for this stop can directly be explained by the oil crisis, the economy collapsed in 
Western Europe and not many migrant workers were needed anymore. Most Turks after 
1974 obtained a residence permit because of family reunion or marriage. Another big 
group of Turks arrived after the military coup in 1980, most of them being left wing 
political refugees. Many Milli Görü§ members (this will be focused on later) left at this
■ от
time Turkey as well. They got asylum in the Netherlands, as well as another group 
who lives in the Netherlands of Kurdish origin. This latter group had mostly arrived 
after 1984, because at that time the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish army 
increased.134
Most workforces were needed in the textile industry and harbor. This spread is still 
visible, still most Turks live where these kinds of industries were concentrated. Most of 
them are living in the big cities in the west of the country and the industrial areas in the 
east of the country.135
In total about 3.6 m illion136 Turks are living in the European Union, of which an 
estimated of 300,000 in the Netherlands. In the rest of Europe as well the groups are 
living in the bigger cities, industrial areas. The Turkish government recognizes this 
large number of people and they have adapted some laws, rules and even special
132 h ttp : / /w w w .acbkenniscen trum .n l/ tu rken
133 W W R; p. 132
134 ht tp : / /w ww.acbkenniscen trum .n l/ tu rken
15 h t tp : / /w w w .acbkenniscen trum .n l/ tu rken
,3<’ h t tp : / /w w w .turk ishdailvnew s .com .tr  -  Turks abroad and the Turkish  lobby -  16th October  2006
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institutions to deal with Turkish citizens living abroad. This policy is important because 
it tells us about the way Turkey thinks about this rather large group of people.
It is hard to find out what kinds of policy the Turkish government adopted. Sources are 
contradictory sometimes. Mehmet Emin Ates, the chairman of the Turks Islamitisch 
Culturele Federatie (TICF, Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation) which is connected 
with the Diyanet, says that until the 1990’s the Turkish government did not have a 
special policy. “It was only after requests from the Dutch Turkish community that the 
Diyanet in 1982 began sending the first Imams to the Netherlands.” 137 They got 
permission from the Dutch government to do so. An important feature is that, in Turkey, 
Özal, the earlier mentioned pro-Islamist politician was then in power. The reason for 
this was that the Turks “wanted to teach children their religion, they needed imams, for 
example people to do the ritual washing for deceased.” 138 Furthermore, the practical 
laws on topics such as heritages, marriage and conscription needed to be arranged.139 
Ates does not have the opinion that the Turkish government is trying to influence the 
Turkish people in the Netherlands. “The government stimulates us to assimilate, the real 
danger are some Turkish radical movements who are against integration.” 140
The opinion of Mr. Haci Karacaer is also important. (Karacaer is the former chairman 
of the Milli Görü§, more attention to him will be paid in chapter 4.) He shares the 
opinion that Turkish legislative policy hardly existed till the 1990’s. “Already, since the 
start of migration to Europe, opposition groups started to organize themselves. First 
they thought in Turkey that this would pass away, but when this turned out not to be 
true they founded Diyanet in Europe as well, just to give some counterbalance” 141 “The 
government tells the Dutch Turks to accept Dutch citizenship, and at the same time stay
137 Lazrak, A. Lazrak, A. -  Hoe ver reikt de lange arm van Rabat en Istanbul? -  interview with Muslim 
leaders in Holland, h t tp : / /w ww.sp .n l/n ieuw s/tr ibune/200108/in tegrat ie .s tm
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loyal to their father country.” 142 Both men argue that the Diyanet is an important 
instrument for Turkish policy in the Netherlands. It would be either just to give 
religious support, or to control the more radical religious groups.
A completely different opinion on how the Turkish government deals with Turkish 
Dutch immigrants can be seen in Mehmet Ülger’s article. He agrees with Karacaer and 
Ates that the Turkish government did not start their official policy until the second half 
of the 1980’s. From that time the total ban on political parties was lifted and the 
organizations in Europe also became more visible. They have been waiting for signals 
from Turkey before stepping out of the background. After 1987, many parties were 
growing, in Turkey as well as in the Netherlands. Turkey finds their citizens abroad 
important for the following reasons:
• Remittances. Estimations are impossible to make, he admits, but 10 billion D- 
Mark (about 5 billion Euros) as a number is mentioned. This is the amount of 
money the Turks transfer in cash to their family in Turkey.
• Investments. Turkey is developing as a major tourist attraction and a lot of that 
money comes from the, once poor, labor migrants, the European Turks.
• Lobby groups. Turkey wants to develop a strong lobby among the millions of 
Turks abroad.143
For those three reasons Turkey wants to “check, influence and steer the Turkish 
community.” 144 They obviously use the embassies for that purpose but they also use all 
kinds of existing movements as well. The Turkish government is also well aware of 
important developments in the last years: the growing role of religion and the stagnation 
of integration, the tendency of people to visit mosques more often and feeling more 
comfortable in their own community.145 The Turkish government tries to help them with
142 Lazrak, A.
143 Ülger, M. -  Hoe de Turkse  overheid  integratie  tegenwerkt  - 
h t tp : / /w w w .katholieknieuw sblad .n l /actueel /kn  173 I e.h tm
144 Ülger, M.
145 Ülger, M.
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this deficiency by sending imams and the Diyanet is the instrument for that again. It is 
“as a commonly known fact” 146 that supporters of all kinds of opposition groups send 
donations to the Islamist political parties and the Turkish government is not very happy 
with that.
Also many representatives of the right wing radical fundamentalist groups are 
represented at the local administration level. Many representatives of the municipal 
houses are at the same time members of the umbrella organizations. So they are 
working as a lobby.147 These are the developments which Ülger tells us are important. 
More proofs can and will be found for the Turkish people to not feel at ease in Dutch 
society. They find their comfort in mosque and safeness in their own community. The 
role of the Diyanet will be studied later as well.
146 Ülger,  M.
147 Ülger,  M.
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3.2 The Turkish minority in the Netherlands
After looking at the history of Turkish migration into the Netherlands, the current 
situation is important. Many reports emerged on the position of Turkish and other 
minority groups; the so called “allochtonen” .
For the thesis, the results of integration of the Turks have been split into several 
different parts which will be mentioned later. The Integration report which is written by 
the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS, Central Office for Statistics) serves as an 
example. Every year, since 2004 they have published an integration map of the country. 
The introduction of this report examines aspects of integration of the “first and second 
generation allochtonen” .
This expression, though hard to translate, is important. Allochtoon literally means 
foreigner, but it is made up as the opposite of the word “autochtoon” autochthon, 
because the other translation for foreigner “buitenlander” had a negative sense in the 
Dutch language and culture. Recently the word allochtoon has become more common. It 
is used to describe a group of people who were not born in the Netherlands, or have at 
least one parent born abroad, but still have the Dutch nationality. The CBS uses the 
word allochtoon as well, and it is important to mention, as they try to approach the 
group of immigrants positively.
Following characteristics are identified by the CBS as crucial for successful
148integration:
• First important aspect is the mastering of the language of the country of 
residence; this is of course an important factor for entrance to education. Do the 
Turks have the same results at schools, do they enter university in the same 
percentage as autochthon people do?
• Work, where do allochtonen work, and what kinds of jobs they have? Are Turks 
more likely to receive social benefits? Do they get equal chances in the labor
148 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) -  Integratiekaart  2006 -  M inistry o f  Jus tice  the 
Netherlands; p. 3
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market? Are they more likely to have lower-educated jobs, or jobs without a 
contract?
• Criminality, criminal behavior can be seen as a result of disenfranchisement and 
lack of social ties in that society. People who are left behind are more likely to 
use illegal methods to obtain success and regards.
• Social relations, do Turks have contact mainly within their own group? With 
whom do they marry? What kinds of sport clubs and organizations do they attend, 
mainly Turkish based or rather mixed? Also an important feature is the 
participation in the cultural field, as well political and social. In what way the 
Turks organize themselves? 149
In the Netherlands 46% of the Turks belong to the so called second generation. This 
means they were born in the Netherlands, but at least one of their parents was born in 
another country than the Netherlands. 150
Education is one of the most important, if not the most important key to successful 
integration.151. Some results have found that Turks score worse at the Dutch exit-tests 
(CITO toets) for primary school, they have a gap of about two and half years when it
I cn
comes to language, and half a year for counting. An important reason for this big 
language problem is the following: 43% of Turks never speak Dutch with their children,
153and another 44% only sometimes do. After primary school only about 25% of the 
Turks attend HAVO/VW O154, the highest educational level in the Netherlands, while for 
autochthon it is about 50%. About 40% of the Turks did not attend any school or only 
primary school. However, optimism is needed as differences seem to be heading 
forward towards less dissimilarity.
( I )  CBS; p. 5
150 ( I )  CBS; p. 8
131 (1) CBS; p. 11
152 ( I )  CBS; p. 12
153 Tubergen, F. van; Kalmijn, M. -  Tw eede ta a lverw ervin g  en taa lgebru ik  o n der Turkse and  
M arokkaanse  im m igranten  in N ederland: in vester ing  o f  g e le g e n h e id l  -  M igrantenstudies  2002; p. 161
154 HAVO: Hoger A lgem een V orm end  Onderwijs ,  h igher general secondary  education 
VWO: Voorbereidend  W etenschappeli jk  Onderwijs ,  pre-universi ty  education
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This of course is caused by the fact the second generation is achieving better results 
than the first generation did. Since 1995 the intake of university students with a Turkish 
background has doubled for example, although this is still lower than the autochthon 
number. (29% to 54 % respectively)155
After having a look at this number, the only possible conclusion is that significant 
differences are visible. Turkish immigrants are doing worse in education than Dutch 
people; this is obviously causing troubles to find better educated and better paid jobs. 
“Participation in the labor market is one of the pillars of the integration and 
emancipation of allochtonen” 156. Making your own living is an important feature for 
feeling at ease in your society, but there is another reason as well. Because of having a 
job the Turks and other allochtonen also get the chance to meet and interact with people 
who have other backgrounds, so this improves the integration in another way.
When we look at the number of people receiving social benefits, the differences are as 
well quite significant.157 About 10% of them get welfare assistance, compared to 2% of 
autochthon people. In total around 29% of Turks in the Netherlands get some kind of 
social benefits, most of them receive WAO (Wet op ArbeidsOngeschiktheid, law on 
inability to work), the benefit which you get if you are unable to work. The CBS 
mention that this will get better, as the first generation often had hard jobs in the 1960’s 
and therefore have all kinds of health problems. However, the second generation Turks 
are also depending more on social benefits than others groups. In fact 14% of the 
Turkish people in the age-group 15 to 25 years depend on social benefits, while 4% of 
the Dutch people in that age-group do.
Unemployment is another big problem among Turks; 14.9% compared to 5.2% of 
autochthon people are unemployed. Also when we look at the younger generation the 
dissimilarity is striking. 23% of Turks are unemployed while 12% of Dutch people in 
the peer group 15 to 24 years old are.
155 ( I )  C BS; p . 11-20
156 (1) C BS; p.25
157 all numbers taken from ( I )  CBS; p. 26-30
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Among working people, from all autochthon men 70% work, among the Turkish men 
this is 50%. Turkish women who have a job make up about 34%, autochthon women 
about 60%. When we look at where most immigrants work, it seems they are over 
represented in the cleaning branch and the retail trade. These are lower paid jobs and
158jobs with less status.
Another noteworthy fact which is typical for the Turks in the Netherlands is that they 
are over represented in setting up their own small enterprises. With their hairdresser’s 
salons, restaurants, change offices and fast food shops, the community is able to employ 
many other people from their community.159 The other migrant groups don’t do this as 
much; it shows the closeness among the Turkish group again.
Examining the statistics for criminality, the Turks are doing much better compared with 
to other allochtonen groups. Nonetheless, 3.6% of Turks have been recorded by the 
police as a suspect, while autochthon people make up 1.7%. The most remarkable fact is 
the almost exclusivity of the heroine trade, 85% of the heroine which was found in the 
Netherlands was transported via Turkey. Roughly all drugs traded in the country are in 
Turkish hands.160
While looking at the numbers for social integration, including among other things 
marriage, it is striking that 90% of Turkish people get married with another Turk. Of 
those marriages about 60% of the spouses are coming from Turkey, they come to the 
Netherlands in the framework of the family-reunion law .161 The fact that those 
newcomers don’t speak the language and are not familiar with the Dutch culture is not 
contributing to integration.
158 (1) CBS; p .39
159 h t tp : / /w w w .a c b k e n n is c e n t ru T n .n l / tu rk e n
16(1 ibid
161 ( I )  CBS; p. 51-53
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Political participation among Turks is high, this has several reasons. The Turks are 
going to elections more than other immigrant groups; also their trust in politics162 is 
larger than other groups.
An important factor of this ratio is the ethnic ties between members of the same 
immigrant group. The more an ethnic group feels attached to itself, the more its 
members will participate in the political and social life. For almost all the distinguished 
parts in this study Turks, compared with other minority groups, have the highest score. 
The Turks also read mostly Turkish newspapers, watch their own TV channels more 
often than other immigrants. Also they have the most Turkish organizations. This all 
assures that they feel connected to their community and want to participate in social life 
because they trust in democracy and its institutions.163
It is a fact that many more Turkish people, rather than immigrants with another 
background, have found their way to the national political scene and are representing 
their ideas in national political parties. We can also see this while looking at the Dutch 
elections held in November 2006.164 Many Turks can be found in the higher positions 
on the ballot, in contrast with the other minority groups.
* * *
As pointed out above, from looking at the numbers I drew the conclusion that things are 
improving. Turkish children are doing better in school than their parents did; they speak 
better Dutch and are less likely than their parents’ generation to depend on social 
welfare. On the other hand their chances and education and wages are still lower than 
their autochthon peer group. At the moment, the Turkish people are not well integrated 
into the society, and the expectations are not very positive. What will the future bring 
when we discuss the integration of Turks into the Netherlands?
162 Instituut voor Migratie  en E tn ische  Studies  (IMES, Institute fo r  Migration  and Ethnical Studies) -  
Politieke participatie  van e tn ische  m inderheden  in vier s teden -  Dutch Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs , 2001; 
p. 18
163 IMES; p. 18
164 Volkskrant  - Overzicht  van kandida tenlijs ten  -  22 nd N ovem ber  2006
Nelleke Meerkerk - 58 - IEPS, February 2007
A research on young Dutch Muslims, not specifically for Turks, shows however that 
young immigrant children are having troubles finding their identity.165 They feel 
outsider in Turkey as well as the Netherlands. Young people are sometimes even 
ashamed of the dreadful situation their parents are living in. Because most of the first 
generation Muslims are not very religious their children see some explanation in this 
fact for being not socially successful. The children fall back on the more traditional way 
of the Islamic religion.166
To conclude let’s look at the population of the three biggest cities of the Netherlands, 
The Hague, Amsterdam and Rotterdam. About 30% of their inhabitants have a non­
western immigrant background; most of them are Muslim. On average in the country 
this is 11% of the people. The future will be completely different. When we look at the 
younger generation of people, the age group of 0 to 20 years old, half of the population 
in the three biggest cities is made up of non-western allochtonen.167
Figure 2: The percentage o f  the population which are non-Western immigrants
о
Nederland Amsterdam Rotterdam Den Haag 
1996 Я 2001 ■ 2006
Bron: CBS
165 Buijs, F. -  M oslim s in N ederland, re lig ieuze  en p o lilieke  orien ta ties, toenadering  o f  verw ijdering  -  
University  o f  Am sterdam  2004; p.4
166 ibid
167 Num bers and graphs from www.cbs.n l
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Figure 3: The percentage o f  the 0-20 years  o ld  which is non-Western immigrants in the 
fou r  b iggest cities com pared  to the whole country.
Bron: CBS
For the future this will mean that the Turkish, and other Muslim minorities, will be 
more influential in Dutch society. What will be their goals and in what way will they try 
to shape Dutch society?
The existence of a lot of contact with Turkey is also important. In what way will they 
try to manipulate these young Turks who are facing many problems in their struggle to 
integrate into Dutch society? It has been proved in this chapter that they will make up a 
huge part of the population in the biggest Dutch cities. The Turks are united in many 
organizations and have a strong attachment to other members of their community. 
Moreover, their political participation is very high. What can be expected from those 
“third generation Turks” as the Dutch media describes them?
Also for Dutch politics the Turks and the other Islamic minorities are very significant. 
Already in the November 2006 elections the Netherlands the “allochtonen factor” was 
very significant. About 10 to 16 of the seats in the government were elected by the 1.2 
million allochtonen who are allowed to take part in the elections.168
. van de 0- tot 20-jarigeni n
Nederland Amsterdam Rotterdam Den Haag
l6l< htlr>://www.clenhaag.r>vda.nl/nieuwsbericht/l  286 
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3.3 Turkish organizations and movem ents in the Netherlands
After looking at the Islamist movement in Turkey it is important to dwell on the fact 
that the Islamic political parties and movements do not only exist there. Also in other 
countries, groups and movements have been established. The Netherlands, which is 
widely regarded as one of the most liberal countries in (at least) the European Union, is 
home to many Islamist organizations which had been founded and gained substantial 
influence in their areas of expertise.
Dutch people started to wonder about Islamic people in their country and much is still 
unknown. Who is creating the organizations, who are their spokesmen and who are they 
representing?
Probably everyone can recall the Dutch movie maker and columnist Theo van Gogh. He 
was brutally killed by a Moroccan Islamist on the second of November 2004 after 
directing the movie Submission, in which he presented a negative view of Islam. Many 
Muslims accuse van Gogh of having anti-Islamic sentiments and denounce his movie as 
portraying Islam unfairly negative. Among other things, this murder and the never 
ending media attention on Islam scared people. It caused people to doubt about all 
aspects of Islam. Who are the people founding these organizations, who are their 
spokesmen and who are they representing? While working on the thesis I closely 
followed the Dutch media, a few of the headlines of the last months follows:
• Wilders fears a tsunami of M uslims169
• “Who does not adapt, will leave the country” 170
• Milli Görü§ Netherlands is radicalizing very quickly171
• Milli Görü§ was never after integration172
• Fear for Turkish radicalization173
• Warning: don’t expect some modern Prada-version of Islam in Europe174
l6J Volkskrant -  W ilders is bang voor Tsunami van M oslim s -  7th O c tober  2006
1711 ibid
171 Benneker,  B. -  Milli Görü? N ederland  radical iseert  snel -  15th May 2006, E lsevier
172 W ynia ,  S.
173 Parool -  Vrees voor Turkse radical isering  -  15th M ay 2006
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Like in many other countries a division is visible between the “Dutch people” on one 
side and “Muslims” on the other side. “The multi-cultural structure of the Netherlands 
was shaken and the attitudes of the Dutch towards the migrants changed negatively in 
early 2000s.” 175 Several large Islamic organizations and movements are present in the 
country and although some of them claim to represent all Muslims, this is naturally 
impossible. The Netherlands as an immigrant country has a huge variety of immigrants 
and only a few people and sources are able to make that distinction. The Islamic 
organizations are working together with the government, for instance as lobby groups, 
so it essential to know who the people are, who they represent and who is behind them.
As described in the previous part, Islamists were in the 1960’s not allowed to assume 
power in Turkey. There were several bans and different Islamic parties were outlawed. 
For this reason many of the persecuted Islamist had escaped abroad. That is one of the 
reasons the Turkish Islamic parties have so many foreign departments and off shoots.176 
The people who are living in the Netherlands or other European countries had set up 
their own movements; they are often recognizable by strong orientation towards their 
mother countries. Also in the 1980’s, many Islamists found their way to the Netherlands. 
Migrants in the Netherlands can feel very attracted to those movements, as they seem to 
have a solution to all the problems they are facing in their new country. Most Turkish 
immigrants in the Netherlands are of rural origin and lowly educated. They have many 
troubles in an unknown society as the Netherlands is for them. While choosing to go the 
mosque, they can choose many differently orientated types; they hope to find some
177support and grip on their lives.
The main question however remains: what kinds of organizations are founded, and what 
are their goals?
174 Ayaan Hirsi Ali,
h t tp : / /w w w .nu .n I /new s/857035 /2 l/H irs i  Ali waarschuwl tegen optim ism e over  % 27Prada- 
islam%27.h tinl
1 nc
http : / /www.turkish  weekly, net/comments.  plip?id=2073
176 ( I ) B innenlandse  Veilighe idsdienst  (BVD) -  Politieke Islam in Nederland -  M ay 1998
177 ( I )  BVD; p .8
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The largest Turkish movement in the Netherlands, the radical Nationalists, is the 
Milliyet^i Haraket Partisi (МНР, National Movement Party) better know as the Grey 
Wolves. They have been mentioned shortly discussing Turkish internal politics but in 
the framework of my thesis there is no space to discuss the МНР more.178 The second 
biggest organization in the Milli Görü§, they are the main focus of the next part of my 
thesis.
* * *
In the Netherlands the mosque is, even more than it was in the countries of origin, a 
place to meet. Very often a supermarket, hairdresser, bookshop and so on are connected 
with the mosque. For the immigrants the mosque symbolizes a piece of homeland in the 
Netherlands.179 The mosques in the Netherlands tend to be divided along ethnic lines; so 
the mosques which are owned by the Turkish community are almost only visited by 
Turks. For this reason, in this thesis I will further focus on the number of mosques and 
guardian of those mosques in the Netherlands.
In Turkey all official mosques are under control of the Diyanet. The Diyanet is this 
special institution from the government which, besides the internal control, oversees 
Muslim religious facilities and education. To repeat the important information about the 
Diyanet: in Turkey itself they provide the mosques with themes which have to be 
discussed in the sermons. The Diyanet also coordinates the building of mosques. 
Together with the Ministry of Education, the institute educates and coordinates the 
imams, who serve in mosques and teach children and adults in Quran schools. This is 
not all; for instance religious TV programs belong to the Diyanet.
People who work for Diyanet are working for the Turkish state.180 After 1971, the 
Diyanet founded a special department for European affairs, as all the migrant workers
l7S More information can be found in: Ülger, M.; Braam, S. -  De eer  der Türken -  De Groene, Decem ber 
1995 http : / /w ww.groene .n l /1995/12  06/turken.htinl
179 BVD: p. 5
180 W W R ; p. 98-99
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in Europe needed to be supported and controlled. This ministry also sends imams 
abroad; they are preaching in Dutch mosques.181
The Islamitische Stichting Nederland, (ISN, Islamic Foundations Netherlands) is a 
branch of the Turkish Diyanet. The Dutch division was set up in 1982, to organize the 
Turkish people and to help them to integrate into Dutch society. Their main goal is to 
“fulfill a bridging function between the Muslims and the multicultural society” 182
The Turkish community is the biggest minority group consisting of 300,000 people183, 
in the Netherlands. Not less than 1125 Turkish organizations, of which at least 356 were 
Islamic based, are set up in the Netherlands.184 This is without a doubt a huge number. 
On top of that 206 Turkish mosques are counted in the country.185 
What are those movements doing, are they connected with each other? Do they have 
connection with political parties or religious movement in Turkey? Also, the schools 
and mosques, in what way are they organized and what are their plans and ideas?
In this thesis it is impossible to mention all groups, but the Milli Görü§ is the biggest 
stream opposing the Diyanet influence in the Netherlands.186 The diverse Milli Görü§ 
groups are united in the Nederlands Islamitische Federatie (NIF, Dutch Islamic 
Federation). The NIF has 53 mosques under control, and a growing number of youth
187groups
The Milli Görü§ is the main focus of my thesis, so it will be better discussed in the next 
chapter. Other institutions are for example based on Kurdish ethnicity, but there is 
unfortunately no space for this in my thesis.
181 (2) Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst  -  De d em o cra tische  rech tsorde  en Is la m itisch  onderw ijs, 
bu iten landse  inm enging en a n ti-in teg ra tive  tendensen  -  February  2002; p. 17
182 www.divanet.n l
183 Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau -  M o slim s in N ederland , Isla m itisch e  o rg a n isa ties in N ed erla n d  -  July 
2004; p. 15
184 SCP; p. 3
185 ib id
186 ib id
187 SCP; p. 9
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In general the mosques approve keeping some distance towards Dutch society. In the 
Friday prayer it is not unusual that the believers are incited to isolate themselves from 
everything which is unclean and sinful, Dutch society being one of those things. Among 
other reasons, this was a motive why Muslims founded their own schools, in which they 
can educate their children in an Islamic way. In the framework of Dutch law they can 
teach the children values and give them religious classes. This had led to increasing 
suspicion and even distrust among the different communities in the Netherlands. Fear 
exists for lack of integration and the supposed financial or ideological influence by 
Turkish radical groups.
To sum up, many organizations, mosques and schools have been founded since the first 
Turkish immigrants came to the Netherlands in the 1960’s. Some of them are Islamic 
based and watched or even controlled by the Turkish government, in the form of 
Diyanet.
Education is an important feature, therefore: how do the Turks want their children to get
189education? In 2006, already 47 Islamic schools existed even though the first one was 
erected in 1985.190 One out o f ten  Islamic families in Rotterdam wants their children to 
go to an Islamic school, 8,500 children in total, so more schools are needed. Islamic 
parents are aware of the fact that many children do not achieve the same results as the 
Dutch children do. In those Islamic schools the discipline is usually much higher, but 
Dutch politicians have warned that the schools are too extreme.191 However, because of 
the growing Muslim population the number of schools is expected to rise. They are 
required to speak Dutch during the lessons, but schools have the freedom to teach
192Islamic values.
188
(1) BVD; p . 12
lh4 W eeda, F. -  Lachen op school is l ich tzinnig  -  NRC, D ecem ber 1998 
h t tp : / /w w w .nrc .n l /W 2/Lab/P rof ie l / ls lam /onderw iis .h tm l
(2) BVD; p. 12
191 W eeda, F.
192 (2) BVD; p. 12
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Mr. Bayraktar, himself of Turkish background, from the Rotterdam municipal house 
said that it makes him sad to see that boys and girls do not require lessons together and 
that even fathers and mothers are asked to come to school separately in order to discuss 
the progress of their children.193 The schools are so popular that also non-Muslims 
teachers at the schools are obliged to wear a headscarf. Because of all the controversy 
the Dutch work and school inspections are planning to test and check the openness and 
tolerance of the schools more regularly. Two years ago one Islamic school had to close 
down. This school only allowed Moroccan children to attend classes and this is not 
allowed according to Dutch constitution. This education is very important for the future 
of Dutch Islamism. What the children get taught at the age of six to twelve is shaping 
them. Minister Mohammed Rabbae has said “I ’m worried that not all Islamic schools 
are after openness and tolerance, this topic needs to be discussed with the chairmen of 
the schools” 1
The fear that education will radicalize children is surely not unfounded, as we have seen 
that tolerance and progressive ideas are not well visible at the schools. Dutch people are 
afraid now “Turkey, via Diyanet, tries to get influence in the Dutch Islamic school 
system. The Diyanet does not want to promote it, but rather tries to stop the 
existence.” 195 This can be explained by the view Diyanet has, religious education is not 
in their interest as this doesn’t fit into the secular polities Turkey has.
193 W eeda,  F.
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3.4 The M illi Görü§ in the Netherlands
In this chapter the focus will be on the Milli Görü§, (MG, National Vision) the largest 
non governmental Turkish Islamic movement worldwide. The Milli Görü§ mixes 
political and religious interests, and is a very interesting Turkish movement as it was 
founded in Western Europe and not in Turkey. In the Netherlands the number of 
members is around 30,000.196 The European headquarters is in Cologne. It is not exactly 
clear when the Milli Görü§ was founded:
In 1974, Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, the cousin of the former Turkish president, established 
the movement and became its president.197 The movement was established after his 
uncle gave the instructions for it. The initial name was Türkische Union Deutschland. It 
was renamed in 1994 to the present name: Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görü§.198 
Another source argues1 9: The history of Milli Görü§ started at the moment the Milli 
Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Movement Party) was outlawed in 1980 after the 
military coup. Turkish guest workers in Western Europe decided they would have to 
organize themselves: officially this was not to protect interests of the MSP but it has a 
connection with it. However, the link with the MSP, Erbakan and the Turkish Islamist 
movement is directly demonstrable.
Milli Görü§ is called “the radicalized branch of the Turkish Islamists200” more than once.
The German branch of Milli Görü§ is openly a very big supporter of Erbakan, but the 
Dutch and German divisions have different views on this issue. This will be explained 
later. The Dutch Milli Görü§ movements are even less likely to admit openly they are in 
contact with Erbakan and other Turkish Islamist leaders. The reasons for this are the 
restrictions Turkey made on the foundation of political parties abroad.201
196 (2) BVD; p. 19
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Another reason can be found in the difficult situation religious parties are facing at the 
moment. However, they state, the aim of the Milli Görü§ is to realize an Islamic based 
Turkey, while using democratic ways. We have seen these ideas before in Turkey, while 
examining the RP, FP and SP. “Although Milli Görü§, in public statements, pretends to 
adhere to the basic principles of Western democracies, abolition of the laicist
government system in Turkey and the establishment of an Islamic state and social
202system are... among its goals.”
The Milli Görii? in the Netherlands is not very likely to totally radicalize, as the new 
generation is looking for a future in the Netherlands rather than in Turkey. Their main 
aim is the right to profess their religion and fight for a “political religious individuality
203within the context of their direct surroundings.”
The Milli Görü§ writes the same on their website. They have to realize that Turks in the 
Netherlands are not leaving anymore, and the future lies here, while preserving the 
Islamic identity. “The Muslim community in the Netherlands should think about 
establishment of a Muslim society in the Netherlands.”204
The Milli Görü§ is never open about the exact names or numbers of their organizations. 
The German branch of Milli Görü§ is accused of lying for years already about the true 
character of their organization. They are not transparent about their umbrella
205organizations and their relations with the Turkish Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan. 
For the same reason it is also very hard to find out how many mosques are in fact 
owned by the Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands.
Some different sources say the following: Ates: “about 40 mosques are led by Milli 
Görüi? imams and about 150 are under direct influence from the Diyanet.”206 Milli Görü§
2112 Vidino, L. Vidino, L. -  The M uslim  Brotherhood 's  C onquest  o f  Europe -  W in ter  2002, Middle  East 
Journal,  h ttp :/ /w ww.m eforum .org /ar t ic le /687
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itself claims to own 30 mosques in only the Northern part of the Netherlands.207
208Elsevier estimates the number to be about 23 in the Netherlands. The CSP mentions a 
probable 45 mosques in the country. The Milli Görü§ surely has quite a few and in those 
mosques they are free to express their ideas.
Milli Görü§ also founded at least six Islamic schools in the Netherlands; they have been 
established on initiative of local leaders, because the Milli Görü§ does not have their 
own educational policy.209 The power struggle between Diyanet and Milli Görü§ is clear; 
both of them are setting up schools.
The Milli Görü§ movement in Europe often faces troubles moving between the wishes 
of their Turkish counterpart and the Western European society they are living in. In the 
Netherlands the group has a relatively large amount of freedom in contrast to the
German faction. The German group has been for suspected for a long time and closely
210observed by security forces.
In the Netherlands the followers can be divided roughly into two parts: the Southern 
group and the Northern group. Two small offshoots also exist but they are very small.211 
The Southern group is more closely connected with the head office in Germany and 
often more traditional in their ideas. The Northern group, headed by Öner Hamurcu 
since May 2006, is said to be more pioneering in their ideas.212 The Northern part is also 
regularly a conversation partner with the government. Their former leader Haci 
Karacaer is praised as being a well integrated Muslim and he is said to be able to close 
the gap between Dutch people and Muslims. The Northern group represents the main 
stream of Islamism; at least that is the way they want to seen by media and Dutch 
citizens.
What are the other things the Milli Görü§ is doing in Holland? The aim of the 
movement is integration in Dutch society while keeping the identity as a Muslim. They
207 Lazrak, A.
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set up a lot of organizations and lessons, sport activities and so on for this reason. One 
example is the wom en’s department, set up in June 1999.
Their four main goals are the same as the Milli Görü§ movement in general. Those four 
goals are uyum (harmony), esjitlik (equality), katilim (participation), üretmek (to 
produce) in the framework of Dutch society.213 They argue that it is possible to integrate 
into Dutch society without losing your own identity, and being Muslim does not have to 
be an obstacle for taking part in the social order. This view fits in the official Milli 
Görü§ point of view for integration and finding a new way to live in a non-Muslim 
society.
* * *
In September 2006 another activity of the Milli Görü§ appeared in Dutch neighborhoods. 
Because of the celebration of 25 years, Osdorp (neighborhood in Amsterdam) the 
“Turkish mosque organization organized a manifestation where the Islamobil officially 
was presented”214. The Islamobil is a mobile information centre where people can ask 
information about the Islam in an informal way. With this movable vehicle the Milli 
Görü§ hopes to positively influence people, as non Muslims “often associate Islam with 
Terror and fundamentalism” . They want to rectify this prejudice.215 The Islamobil was 
already used in Germany, where the “German public reacted positively” and if the 
responses in the Netherlands are also positive the German texts in the vehicle will be 
translated into Dutch.216
Haci Karacaer, the former chairman of Milli Görü§, is often said to be praised as being 
a good reformer in the Turkish political scene in the Netherlands. He set up contacts
217with Jewish and Christian organizations for example.
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Chapter 4 -  Relations between Turkish Islamist and the Netherlands
4.1 The links between the T urkey’s Islam ists and M illi Görü§
In this chapter the central part of my thesis will be discussed. The link between the 
Milli Görü§ movement in the Netherlands, the leading Turkish party AKP, and the 
smaller but more radical Saadet Partisi will be explored. During my research I found 
many indications and suggestions so I will try to prove that the Milli Görü§ and the 
Turkish Islamists have a strong tie, although this is not admitted by both sides. In an 
overview I will first try to give all the facts which were found in my thesis so far and 
then new ones will be added.
First the situation in the Netherlands will be discussed, regarding the Dutch Milli Görü§. 
Secondly, we will look at the history of Milli Görü§ in Turkey and the way Turkish 
politicians perceive the Milli Görü§ right now.
I want to first make clear that the Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands has always denied 
having any ties with any of the political parties headed by Erbakan. The movement does 
not want to admit their ties with Erbakan because of the fact that he is in jail and 
banned from political life.218 Hamurcu does not that deny the clear link with Erbakan, 
but he mentions Erbakan as the founder. Nowadays he is not the leader anymore, the 
Milli Görü§ members feel sympathy for him but he is an old man and not interesting for 
them anymore.219 But facts sometimes show something different from this official 
statement.
First of all: the name of the Dutch Milli Görü§ is a clear link with Erbakan. The name 
Milli Görü§ is taken from the pamphlet, written in 1975 by the former Turkish 
president.220 In this little book he describes the perspectives and strategy for the 
establishment of an Islamic republic in Turkey. In this new Islamic Turkey the stress
218 ( I )  BVD; p . 14
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has to be on industrialization and education. In this pamphlet he calls the Milli Görü§ 
“the medicine for all diseases”221 as an ideology.
In the previous chapter it was already mentioned that the nephew of Erbakan is the 
chairman of Milli Görü§. He founded the party either after direct or indirect instructions 
from his uncle. Erbakan definitely still has very strong ties with the Milli Görü§ 
movement in Europe. It is stated that the “Former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin 
Erbakan...is still Milli Görü§' undisputed leader, even if his nephew Mehmet Sabri 
Erbakan is its president.”222
Although the Milli Görü§ in Turkey itself is not working as a political party, the 
movement does exist there. The followers are supporting the creation of Islamic parties, 
as they are striving for the same; for Islamic influence in daily life and politics. The 
chairman of Saadet Partisi is very clear about the influence Milli Görü§ has. “After the 
military coup in 1980 the Milli Görü§ Community formed a new party: Refah Party.”223 
The people who support Milli Görü§’ ideas are not united in one single party but many 
Milli Görü$ supporters have been member of the Refah or Fazilet party. At the moment
Milli Görü? supporters can be found among SP members. Kutan, the chairman, is linked
i 224to the movement.
* * *
In June 1998, a big Milli Görü§ meeting was organized in the Amsterdam Arena, about
40,000 people attended. In 2002, another big meeting was organized in Arnhem.
Erbakan was the keynote speaker and he provided a glimpse into Milli Görü§' ideology. 
After a tirade against the evils of integration in the West and U.S. policies, Erbakan 
declared that after the fall of the wall the West found an enemy in Islam.225 These kinds
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of statements are of course not helpful for the integration of Turkish Dutch people, 
which the Milli Görü? claims to have as a goal. The 2006 European Milli Görü§ meeting 
was held in Hasselt, Belgium. The supposed leader Erbakan was speaking to the 20,000 
followers by satellite on that day.226
After Erdogan, who can be considered in many ways the successor of Erbakan, came to 
power he told the Turkish embassy’s to Germany and the Netherlands to support the 
Milli Görü§ from now on and not work against them.227 This is of course caused by the 
fact that the embassies are working closely together with the Diyanet, and they 
represent the official Islam. Apparently Erdogan wants to promote the Milli Görü§ ideas, 
which are said to be more radical.
What happened to the Milli Görü§ movement in Turkey after the pamphlet in 1975?
The movement was growing, we saw many politicians being attracted to the ideas of 
Erbakan. After 1980 however, the Islamist parties had a hard time in Turkey. Erbakan 
decided then to move the centre of their activities to Europe, where “the members of the 
Milli Görü§ had much more freedom than in Turkey.”228 What exactly the Turkish 
media thinks about the Milli Görü§ movement in Western Europe is not clear. They are 
sure of the fact that the Saadet Partisi has very strong ties with the Milli Görü§
229movement.
The soft coup in 1997 mentioned above made clear once again that the Islamist parties 
found themselves in a difficult position. Several parties like MSP, RP and FP were 
created but were consistently banned. The younger and more progressive part of the 
movement decided then for a split. A struggle had already been visible for a few years 
between the yenilikgiler (progressive) and gelenek§iler (conservative) wings. Under the 
leadership of Erdogan and GUI the progressive wing of the AKP splintered, while the SP 
continued as the more conservative wing after the FP. The first word Adalet of the AKP
226 Telegraaf -  20.000 mensen op jaarvergadering Milli Görüs -  4 lh June 2006
227 W ynia ,  S.
228 W W R ; p. 104
114 h l lp : / /www..saadetfa lih .org/deta il.asD?calegorvld=2&contentld= 1 146187988156
Nelleke Meerkerk - 7 3 - IEPS, February 2007
refers explicitly to the Adalet Partisi which was popular during the 1960's and
1970’s.230
After this split in Islamist parties “Erdogan has taken a slower, steadier path, careful not
to rock the establishment too quickly while at the same time floating an occasional trial
231balloon for social reforms to advance the Islamist agenda.“ We can see that he did 
not lose his Islamic roots, as his wife for example comes to public events with her head 
covered. He also tried to criminalize adultery, but this proposal was not implemented as 
a law.232 Next year presidential elections will be held in Turkey and a discussion now is 
taking place on whether it is possible for the first lady to wear a head scarf.233 In Turkey 
the tension between Secularists and Islamists is growing. In November 2006 a march 
was held against the government. The reason for this was that “Erdogan, a devout
234Muslim, has been denying trying to lead the country down a more Islamist path”'  and 
slowly implementing all kinds of Islamist laws. Among the protestors were retired army 
officers. The army can’t do much against the AKP, as new laws have been accepted in
235order to acces the EU.
What exactly do the Islamists in Turkey say about the Milli Görü§?
Recai Kutan, the SP chairman, held a speech for the International Youth Forum. It 
shows quite clearly that he is a big supporter of the Milli Görü§ movement. He mentions 
that the Milli Görü§ movement derives from the ideas in the pamphlet written by 
Erbakan. Currently Turkish politics are divided by leftists and rightists, but this is the 
wrong way. The Just Order is the right way, “the mentality of Milli Görü§.”236 Thanks 
to the Milli Görü§ the towns became wealthy living places and the Islamic world should 
learn form the ideas of Milli Görü§, as they represent a success story. The aim of the
23(1 W W R; p. 106
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people who are attracted by the Milli Görü§ ideas is not to obtain power or money, 
rather they are doing so because of the willingness of Allah.237
The Turkish newspaper Milli Gazette stated that “Milli Görü§ is a shield protecting our 
fellow citizens from assimilation into barbaric Europe” The Milli Gazette is not 
linked with the Milli Görü§ or the Islamists but can be regarded as being on the slightly 
religious side.
Another link which is obvious between the Milli Görü§ and AKP, SP and their 
predecessor is the religious order Nak§ibendi. Milli Görü§ derives from the Nak§ibendi 
movement, which was also bringing forth the leaders of the Islamist movement in 
Turkey.239
“Milli Görü§ claims to defend the rights of Germany's immigrant Turkish population, 
giving them a voice in the democratic political arena while preserving their Islamic 
identity. But Milli Görü§ has another agenda. While publicly declaring its interest in 
democratic debate and a willingness to see Turkish immigrants integrated into European 
societies, some Milli Görü§ leaders have expressed contempt for democracy and 
Western values”240
As afore mentioned the Islamists might use the Milli Görü§ to gain money. Since the 
AKP’s electoral success, the economy development in Turkey has been enormous.
In the five years before the AKP assumed power, Turkey's currency devalued from 
around 200,000 lira to just over 1.7 million lira against the dollar. In the first two years 
of the AKP government, the Turkish currency actually strengthened to 1.5 million lira 
to the dollar. In January 2005 the new currency was introduced, the lira lost six zeros. 
This was psychologically important for Turkey, as hyperinflation was the norm for a
i • 241long time.
ib id237
238 Vidino, L.
13,W W R ; p .  106
240 Vidino, L.
241 (1) Rubin, M.
Nelleke Meerkerk - 7 5 - IEPS, February 2007
Why was the AKP able to reach such an enormous economic success? Of course 
policies were changed, but another interesting factor can be seen in the foreign 
investments. Most of the investments namely came from Islamic countries, Saudi 
Arabia as the first one. This so called green money (Islamic) assured a better economy 
and gave people more trust in AKP. The money did not only come from Islamic 
countries, “other green money operations funded by workers in Germany”242 gave a 
great deal of money as well. Turkey’s Islamists were supported by the amount of 
“between $2 and $3 billion”243 by Islamist holding companies in the years between 1990 
and 1996. With this green money the Islamists can take popular measures to gain 
popularity, but it seems the money does not come officially from Europe anymore.244 
However, most of the money remains in the unofficial economy and can never be traced. 
This does not exclude that Milli Görü§ members might bring money to Turkey.
Another important link between the Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands and the Islamist 
parties is that people can still vote in Turkey.24S Turkish people living in the 
Netherlands can vote for the elections in Turkey. Many Turkish people have a dual 
nationality, which is very important. Turks can vote in both countries, the Dutch 
politicians try to convince their potential voters but why would the Turkish politicians 
not do the same? This obviously means they can try to use the Diyanet, Milli Görü§ or 
one of the other movements, groups or parties in the Netherlands to obtain influence. 
When the Islamists can enlarge their influence on the Turkish Diaspora, this will mean 
more votes in Turkey.
“Erdogan tries, as the political heritor from Erbakan, via Diyanet, to directly influence 
the Turkish communities abroad.”246
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4.2 Last developments of M illi Görü§, under increasing Turkish influence
The Milli Görü§ has been watched closely by the German Secret Service. The suspicion 
in the Netherlands has only grown since the new chairman was elected for Milli Görü§ 
in the North Netherlands.247 Dutch society is anxious about more radical Islamist 
influence from Germany and Turkey. As an example I want to mention the choice the 
Amsterdamse Centrum voor Buitenlanders (ACB, Amsterdam Centre for Foreigners) 
made. They made the decision to stop any financial support which they provided the 
Milli Görü? with immediately after the, what they call, “fundamentalist assumption of 
power.”248
May 2006 was a breaking point for the Dutch part of Milli Görü§. In this month the 
complete management was replaced by people recommended by the German faction. 
This led to heated discussions in the Netherlands, not only among the Milli Görü§ 
members and supporters, but also among the Dutch citizens. The Dutch media was quite 
clear about the May 2006 events. “The German fundamentalists completed their 
assumption of power in the Netherlands by appointing Öner Hamurcu as the new 
chairman”249 It is quite clear who is holding the power in the Dutch faction now: the 
Germans Milli Görü§ who is “militant and incredibly conservative.”250 The reason for 
the replacement of Karacaer was that he was too progressive. There was “no support for 
his ideas and Cologne intervened.”251
The new chairman, Hamurcu, who had been raised in the Netherlands, does not agree 
with those opinions. He told the media: “the Germans did not take over our policy, we 
will continue the same path as we did" and moreover: “we are Dutch Muslims; our 
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the path of openness and tolerance that his predecessor has started and he got 
permission from Germany for this. 53 The head quarter is Germany can be compared 
with the role the Vatican has for the Catholic Church: only ideological ties exist, no 
juridical ones.254
Haci Karacaer, the former chairman of the Milli Görü§, said farewell to the organization 
in May 2006. Who exactly is this person who is called a “Super Turk” 55 as well as “a 
wolf in sheep’s clothing?”256 From Kurdish roots he immigrated to the Netherlands in 
1982 and he quickly made a good career. He always states that Muslims in Western 
Europe have to “emancipate through participation.”257 The image of the Milli Görü§ has 
changed under his leadership. Karacaer exposed himself to the media very often and 
with his friendly way of speaking and his knowledge he makes a good impression. 
“Under his supervision the Milli Görü§ became a legitimate conversation partner for the 
Dutch government.”258 However, he was representing the movement in the Netherlands 
and his supporters are not as progressive as he might be. Karacaer called his backing 
backwards, but still he continued with the struggle for more tolerance and openness in
259the Dutch society: his keyword was integration. Right after his departure the more 
traditional German wing took over the leadership in the Northern Dutch branch. The 
Germans replaced the whole board of the Northern Dutch part.260 Karacaer agrees that 
the path he took will be continued by Hamurcu.
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4.3 The role and attitude of the Dutch governm ent
The Dutch government, as said, did not follow the Milli Görü§ very closely. This has 
changed after the new chairman was appointed.261
An explanation for the fact that the Netherlands did not check the Milli Görü§ as the 
Germans did can be found partly in the tolerant image of the Dutch. This image is 
shaped by their historic desire to be open to other cultures in order not to shut off 
possible trade partners262 However, after the killing of Theo van Gogh things has 
changed. Many reports about terror and extreme Islamism were published. The 
mosques, for their part tried to comfort the Dutch people and government.
The Dutch interpretation of tolerance had effectively casted a blind eye to dangerous 
developments on it own soil.263
Government subsidies are given to the Milli Görü§ women’s department. In the years 
2006 to 2008 an amount of 33,000 Euros will be given.264 In the Netherlands it is hard 
to find allochtonen, especially women, for representation in the government. Because 
the Milli Görü§ has a lot of members, they want to try to get their supporters involved 
in politics. By means of trainings, meetings and internships the aim is to involve these 
women in the society and political movements.265
Milli Görü§ also receives money for other projects; the current thing they are working 
on is an “anti radicalization” project in cooperation with the Dutch government.266
In the Netherlands the Islamic elementary schools and high schools receive subsidies267 
as they are regarded as normal Dutch schools. They are special schools, like schools 
based on Christianity or special learning methods like Montessori. The First Islamic
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University in Rotterdam however does not receive any money,268 as they are not 
recognized as a public school but as a private initiative. The university has a lot of 
internal problems, which are caused by Turkish interference. The Diyanet does not like 
the Islamic schools; they prefer to see schools based on “being-Turk” rather than 
“being-Muslim.”269 The Dutch government is closely following the Diyanet, they don’t 
approve of meddling in the Dutch educational system. On the other hand the Internal 
Security Service sees no signs of subversion in the more Islamic based school 
established by Milli Görü§; those schools “do not cause troubles for the democratic 
legal order.”270
268 (2) BVD; p. 14
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4.3.1 The W esterm oskee as a case study
To explain the complicated situations which are rising now in the Netherlands I want to 
use the Westermoskee (Westermosque) in Amsterdam. After years of struggle Karacaer 
finally got the approval to build a giant mosque in Amsterdam, including 110 houses 
and several offices and shops in the complex. This “Islamic mini city”271 was the crown 
of his work. After 15 years the first stone was finally laid in March 2 006 .272 The 
mosque is a revolutionary one supposed to symbolize the integration of the Turkish 
community into the Netherlands. The design itself is meant to represent integration as 
the brick stones are Dutch, but the style is inspired by Aya Sofia in Istanbul. Also this 
Turkish mosque will be the first one where men and women enter through the same 
entrance.
Another important feature is the name. It is very exceptional in the Netherlands to have 
a Dutch name for a mosque. The name is inspired by the Westerkerk (Westerchurch)
273which was once the biggest Protestant church in the Netherlands.
A short while after Hamurcu took over Karacaer's position the construction of the 
building stopped.274 The owner of the building is now calling for an immediate stop of 
construction, as he fears the fundamentalist influence from Germany as well. The 
ownership is a complicated matter, both the Woningbouwvereniging Het Oosten 
(Housing association the East) and Manderen INC are owners. In Manderen INC the 
Milli Görüij is represented, as well two youth organizations and the Aya Sophia 
organization. All of those are linked to the Milli Görü§.275 The city council and 
Woningbouwvereniging Het Oosten will not accept the new board, as long the Milli 
Görü§ does not change its policy they will not give permission for the mosque to be 
built.276
271 Volkskrant -  Minaret nog alt ijd  lager  dan W estertoren  -  1 I th M arch 2006
272 Benneker,  B.
271 Volkskrant  -  Minaret nog alt i jd  lager  dan W estertoren -  1 l lh M arch 2006
274 Parool -  Bouw W este rm oskee  ligt stil -  7 lh O c tober  2006
275 Interview Hamurcu
276 Parool -  Bouw W este rm oskee  lig t stil -  7 'h O c tober  2006
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They argue furthermore that the radical Islamists from Germany finally showed their 
true face. Now that the mosque has finally begun construction they don’t agree anymore
277with Karacaer’s liberal plans. Milli Görü§ Netherlands, whose members collected the 
money for building the mosque, does not agree. They don’t like the condition from the 
Amsterdam city council, according to which the Milli Görü$ can not have ties with the 
mosque anymore.278 The Milli Görü§ tries to negotiate about the conditions at the 
moment with Het Oosten and the city council. The Milli Görü§ members paid for the 
church and were looking forward to finally be able to visit their long planned mosque. 
They don’t want to accept any mingling from any other authority, neither the
requirement that an extern Raad van Toezicht (Council of Supervision) will supervise
i 279the mosque.
277 ib id
278 Volkskrant -  M inaret  nog alt ijd  lager dan W estertoren  -  11th March 2006 
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Chapter 5 -  Islamist politics in the Netherlands
5.1 The finding of Islamist political parties in the Netherlands.
Dutch people with a Turkish background have been taking part in the Dutch elections 
for a long time already. For the elections to the Tweede Kamer (lower house) held in
2006 about ten people were from Turkish origin.280 60% of the immigrants usually vote
281for the left wing parties,‘ and as well most Turkish candidates are candidates for the 
left wing parties. As this thesis can not cover all political parties in the Netherlands 
only one party will be discussed.
This year in the elections, for the first time, an Islamic party took part. This new party 
Islam Democraten (Islamic Democrats) was founded only one year ago and the party 
appeared for the first time in the municipal elections from The Hague, spring 2006.282 
Their slogan was “for unity in the society” and this was as well the one used for the 
national elections in November 2006. The party does not use “allochtonen for drawing
283voters”'  but the new party selected “all their candidates, especially the Turkish ones...,
284based on their principles and qualities”'  From the eight candidates two are Turks,
Their main objections on the current Dutch political parties are the fact they neglected 
the allochtonen for such a long time. From the time the first Muslims came to the 
Netherlands the relations have not gotten any better, and the Dutch State is the one to
285blame for that. The ID aims to improve integration and to avoid a split in society." Mr. 
Arif Potmis, the first man on the list, says that the party is not in any way connected
with the Milli Görü§. However, he knows a lot of members of the Milli Görü§ and
• 286 • • 287hoped that they will vote for the party. At the elections they only received 4341 
votes, so we can conclude that this party is not influential at all.
280 Volkskrant,  22nd o f  N ovem ber
281 ht tp : / /w ww.denhaag.pvda .n1/nieuwsbericht/ l  286
282 www.is lam -dem ocra ten .n l
283 ib id
286 Arif  Potmis , in an email
287 Volkskrant -  verkiezingen 2006 -  23rd November 2006
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On the 22nd of March 2006 another political party was presented in the Dutch media. 
Their name is Partij voor Allochtone Nederlanders (PAN, Party for Dutch allochtonen) 
and their aim was to take part in the planned elections of 2007. The party did not 
become an official party as it is not included on the elections program.288 The elections 
were earlier as the government fell down. Still the PAN ideas have to be discussed very 
briefly, as it shows which ideas exist among Dutch people. Hans Hoogerdijk, one of the 
founders, finds allochtonen very valuable for Dutch society and he does not want them 
to integrate. They need to be proud of their roots and Dutch people should learn 
something from their qualities. The party had planned to change its name into Partij 
voor Alle Nederlanders (PAN, Party for all Dutch)
Dutch people were for a long time unaware of the fact that immigrants make up such a 
large part of the electorate. Allochtonen represent quite a large percentage of the 
inhabitants. Karacaer stated that “The realization that immigrants are a power factor is a 
revelation. It seems to hit hard in parts of The Netherlands.” when he talked about the 
allochtonen factor in the elections in the Netherlands. It also means that the “presence 
of immigrants in Dutch politics is of a permanent nature”289 In the future Muslims will 
be more influential in Dutch politics. In the first national elections where they took part, 
possibly the Islam Democraten was not successful because of the poor organization. 
However, in the future this may change. The Milli Görü§ is a well organized group and 
when they would start to have political ambitions they could be successful. The Milli 
Görü§ leaders are highly educated people and have a lot of work experience in public 
administration. It is not clear whether Milli Görü? want to start a political wing, or have 
any ambitions is this direction. The organization finds it important that their members 
are “full citizens” in their country of residence, and to this feature also belongs going 
for elections.290 Questions about political ambitions were a little avoided, but it will for 
sure not be in the near future Hamurcu said.
2,(lf Volkskrant,  22nd o f  March 2006
289 Schaake, M.
290 Interview Hamurcu
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Conclusion
The main topics in this thesis were Turkish history, with the focus on Islamist political 
parties. Furthermore the Turkish migration to the Netherlands and the organizations 
established by Turks in the Netherlands were discussed.
I wanted to show that we can regard the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) as an 
Islamist party. The AKP, which was established in 2001, won the last elections in 
Turkey with nearly 35%. They have been the ruling party since 2002. Erdogan, its 
prime minister, had been in jail for spreading Islamist ideas. He served as mayor in 
Istanbul where he had drastic ideas such as separate school busses for boys and girls 
and a total ban on alcohol. On several occasions later he dissociated himself from those 
ideas, but I was able to find many proofs and signs that this is more a strategic change 
than a sincere change of ideology.
1 wanted to give evidence that the Turkish people in the Netherlands are badly 
integrated; through use of statistics this was proved. They have, compared to Dutch 
people, worse education and lower paid jobs. They are not socially integrated with 
Dutch people; they still marry very frequently within their own group. This poor 
integration makes the Turks more likely to be radical in professing their religion, give 
more importance to their language and own cultural groups as it is their only connection 
to society. The Turks has founded many organizations and a large part of them are 
religious based.
I wanted to prove that the Turkish (Islamist) political parties want to gain and keep 
influence over the Turkish people in the Netherlands. The government does this by 
means of the Diyanet, the ministry of religious affairs. The Diyanet has one big rival, 
the Milli Görü$. Milli Görü§ is the biggest movement in the Netherlands which mixes 
religion and social work. As I have shown the Turkish government and Islamic political 
parties are meddling for example in the educational system in the Netherlands, Milli 
Görü§ affairs and the building of mosques.
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I wanted to prove that they are doing so in order to keep the Turkish community close 
to their mother country. The Islamists use even the Dutch Turks for their own purposes. 
1 think it is clear that the Islamist parties in Turkey, whether the Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi (as the progressive wing) or the Saadet Partisi (as the conservative wing) are 
trying to influence their citizens abroad. Possible they need the money they have or the 
votes for the elections in Turkey. For the Turkish government it is also important to 
have a lobby group. I have shown that the Milli Görü$ is representing the Turks; they 
perform as spokesmen for the Turkish community often at the national level. The most 
recent development is the building of an enormous Milli Görü§ mosque complex in the 
centre of Amsterdam. This construction recently has been called off by the Dutch 
government out of fear of radical Turkish influence.
To conclude, I could not find direct proofs that the Milli Görü§ is serving as a puppet 
for the Turkish Islamists. However, the direct indirect indications which I was able to 
find led me to believe that the spiritual and practical connection exists. The Milli Gorus 
in the Netherland seems to work for itselve and the Muslims living there.
The Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands speaks openly about integration, projects they work 
on with the governement. On the other hand they still have ties with the more radical 
faction in Germany and the Islamist Parties in Turkey, who do not support integration. 
The Milli Görü? attracts a lot of young Turkish second of third generation. They have 
troubles finding their identity and hope to find some comfort in Islam. Even more than 
their parents’ generation they trust on religion and fall back on heir roots.
I think it is well possible that the Dutch Milli Görü§ starts to have an Islamic based 
political party. This party would be linked with other Muslims, not only the most 
obvious Turkish Muslims. The Milli Görü§ feels attracted to Islamic ideas and has 
strong, well educated leaders. Because so many badly integrated Muslims live in the 
Netherlands the Milli Görü§ has a good change to organize itself and obtain a powerful 
position in the Dutch society.
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Appendix 1 -  List of Turkish political parties
List of Turkish political parties, ordered as they have been founded:
founding demise Is
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican People’s Party) 1923 -
Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi (SCF, Free Republican Party) 1930 1930
Demokrat Parti (DP, Democratic Party) 1946 1960 X
Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party) 1962 1980 X
Milliyetgi Hareket Partisi (МНР, National Movement Party) 1969 -
Milli Nizam Partisi, (MNP, National Order Party) 1971 1971 X
Milli Selämet Partisi (MSP, National Salvation Party) 1972 1980 X
Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, True Path Party) 1983 (87) -
Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party) 1983 -
Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) 1983 (87) 1998 X
Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left Party) 1985 (87) -
Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) 1998 2001 X
Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party) 2001 - X
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) 2001 - X
The dates show the year in which the party was established. In those cases were the 
parties could not run for elections the year in brackets shows the first time they ran for 
election. The reason for this was either that their leaders were banned from political life 
or no election was held.
Many more parties were founded but it is impossible to mention them all. 1 have tried to 
choose carefully the parties I wanted to discuss. Obviously, the most recent big parties 
and influential older ones are among them.
A graphical overview of the succeeding parties. The link between DP and AP with the 
MNP and MSP is different in every source. But I consider them as being connected in
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some way. In the 1980’s “ANAP welcomed a large group of former MSP members, who 
probably were attracted to the party because Ozal and some of his relatives had 
belonged to the MSP in the 1970s”291
The link with FP and AKP is clear because “the votes and seats for the AKP are
292compared to those won by the Virtue Party (FP) in 1999”
A schematical overview of the consession line in Turkish politics, regarding Islamist 
parties.
DP i >  АР с
V
MNPi >  MSP с
= >  DYP
ANAP (short coaliton)
= >  RP ' >  FP i... C > SP
AKP
We can consider the split of FP in 1997 as the split between the yenilik^iler 
(progressive) and gelenekgiler (conservative) wings. The SP represents the more 
conservative wing, which openly expresses their ties with Milli Görü§ and the wishes 
for more strict Islamic rules. The AKP is a more mainstream party.
291 hnp://countrvs tud ies .us /tu rkev /85 .h tm
242 h t tp : / /w w w .n tvm snbe .com /m odules /sec im 2002/genel .a sp
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Appendix 2 -  Symbolism in Islamist political movements
The most known symbol is the crescent and star. Originally used by 
the Ottoman Empire, but now commonly accepted as symbol for the 
entire Islamic world. The Ottomans separated for first time the 
religious flag and the national flag. The national flag was red with 
crescent facing right, while the religious flag was green. Later, a five- 
cornered star was added to symbolize the five pillars of Islam.
О
Fazilet Partisi: the crescent is still visible but the stars are replaced 
by five lines, and a heart. The number 5 represents the 5 pillars is 
Islam.
The flag of the Saadet Partisi, very clearly symbolizes Islam: five 
five-cornered stars and the crescent.
С*
млпггпипМ
Symbol of CHP, they are not an Islamist party, but the counterpart. 
CHP is at the moment the second biggest party in Turkey and that 
shows the clash between Islamism and Secularism.
The six arrows represent the six pillars of Atatürk’s policy.
Symbol of AKP, the light bulb represents a modern but yet 
religious Turkey. “AKP supporters carry images of their leader, 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan alongside banners of Kemal Atatürk. The 
AKP symbol is nonetheless a light-bulb with seven beams, to 
signify the seven regions of Turkey - simultaneously modernistic 
and emblematic of the recurring Islamist theme of enlightenment
293after darkness.
24:1 Culiff, P. -  The double death of Islamic Fundamentalism - http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2003- 
01 /fundamentalism.htm
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Appendix 3 -  Interview with Mustafa Hamurcu
Interview with Mr. Hamurcu, Amsterdam 3rd of January 2007
After long trying I was finally able to meet Mustafa Hamurcu in Amsterdam. In this city 
the Milli Görü§ has their temporary head quarter. The Hamurcu family is well 
represented in the Milli Görü§. Mustafa is the spoke man; his twin brother Nurdogan is 
the secretary. Their older brother Öner is the new chairman since May 2006.
I was warmly welcomed and we spent about one and a half hour together in which 
Hamurcu explained me all about the Milli Görü§ organisation. It was clear to me that he 
is a good spokesman; he has his story ready to tell. It was hard for me to ask critical 
questions specifically about my thesis as he kept on going about the structure, history, 
activities and plans the Milli Görü§ has.
I decided to leave it like this, as it was my first meeting with any Milli Görü§ member. 
Although I did research for about half a year on this organisation it was still very 
unclear what exactly they stand for and do in the Netherlands. For this reason it was a 
very interesting meeting and I am happy w e’ve met.
In my thesis I would like to summarize the interview into some short version, a lot of 
the basic information he told me can be found already in the previous parts. Hamurcu 
confirmed for a great deal the fact and figures I found from several other sources. I 
would like to give here only the new data and interesting added information.
Information on the Milli Görü§ in general:
> The Milli Görü§ is an organization which is 100% depending on the 
contribution the members pay. They don’t make any profit and all people work 
for the Milli Görü§ do so on voluntary basis.
> Milli Görü§ does not consider itself as a Turkish organisation; in the first place 
it is based on Islam as identity. This in contrast with the Diyanet, who is 
mainly Turkish identity based.
>  Milli Görü§ has organisations founded in the following eleven countries:
The Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Swiss, Austria, 
France, Australia, Canada and Italy.
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> The Milli Görü§ has indeed a very clear link with Erbakan 40 years ago, but 
not anymore. The third generation realises that their future lies in the 
Netherlands and not in Turkey. Hamurcu repeats that for the Milli Görü§ 
members being Muslim is more important than being Turk
Information Hamurcu gave about the changing of the whole board. This is currently a 
hot topic in the Netherlands. I am aware of the fact this was his main point of concern. 
The media writes very negative on the Milli Görü§ and in every opportunity he gets 
Hamurcu tries to stress the fact that the media is not playing a fair game.
>  The new board, 6 members, are for the greatest part people who worked together 
with Karacaer. Karacaer is the man who is praised for his progressive ideas and 
his cooperation with the Dutch government.
>  Support and cooperation for integration will continue, but the new board also 
wants to keep the older generation satisfied. Karacaer was too progressive for 
them, as Hamurcu argues.
>  The new Milli Görü§ board stresses the fact “well being of the whole humanity” 
Being a good, complete member of the society you live in, which means 
different things in Germany, Australia or The Netherlands. This also explains 
why the Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands has a different approach, ideas and 
leadership than the German branch. Milli Görli§ members have to be good Dutch 
citizens, and keep their Muslim identity.
>  The Milli Görü§ has in its 40 years of existence never had any problems with 
justice, never any serious allegation or troubles. Nobody ever found any proofs 
for sending “Green Money” or support for the Turkish government.
>  Hamurcu finds the army the ones in power in nowadays Turkey. As a Muslim he 
is against the secular republic in Turkey. He did not say it that clear; however, he 
argues that a First Lady wearing a head scarf should be possible in a Muslim 
populated country.
> Milli Görü§ never gave any voting advice, although the organization thinks it is 
important to vote. A full citizen should not forget this right and go for every 
election.
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> Hamurcu mentions as Milli Görü§’ current projects the donor-project and an 
anti-extremist project. The donor project means extra attention in the Friday 
prayer that people can become donor.294 The Muslim community in the country 
is not very willing to become donor. The anti-extremist project is held in 
cooperation with the government, they try to avoid Turkish young man to 
radicalize. Hamurcu focussed on the fact they the Milli Görü§ is asked to do this 
project, as a proof they are certainly not extremist.
I also talked about with Hamurcu about his ideas on Turkish politics. He finds that 
the AKP has another strategy than the Fazilet had. They are more careful in their 
statements and take a slower path, although they are after the same goals. Hamurcu 
also think that the AKP is still an Islamist party. However, the Milli Görü§ is not a 
follower of any Turkish political party. They feel sympathy for the AKP, as their 
leaders were the founders of the Milli Görü§ movement in Germany and later on in 
the Netherlands.
He stressed again that Milli Görü§ has not any link with Turkish political parties, 
Islamist or not. In the first place they are a Muslim organization, not a Turkish one.
244 In the Netherlands you are not a donor, unless you say you are. Plans exist to change this law, so far it is not 
like this. A big shortage on donor material is the result.
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Diverse websites on Turkish history:
• http://www.ataturk.com
• http://mediaguidetoislam.sfsu.edu/intheworld/02a civilization.htm
• http://countrvstudies.us/turkev/ (website from the federal research division in the 
USA about Turkey)
• http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/ottoman fetva.htm
• http://www.allaboutturkev.com/ist muze.htm 
Political parties in Turkey:
• http://www.akp.org.tr (website AKP)
• http://www.saadetpartisi.org.tr/ (website Saadet Partisi)
• http://www.saadetfatih.org/detail.asp?categorvId=2&contentId=l 146187988156 
(website Saadet Partisi in a neighborhood of Istanbul)










• http://www.acbkenniscentrum.nl/turken (Amsterdam Knowledge Centrum, facts 
about Turkish migration)
• http://www.divanet.nl
• http://www.denhaag.pvda.nl (website Labour Party)
• www.islam-democraten.nl (new Islamic political party in the Netherlands)
Milli Görü§ in the Netherlands:
• http://www.mgned.nl The Milli Görü§ website, not up-to-date)
• http://www.milligorus-forum.com/forum/ (Forum of the Milli Görü§)
• http://www.mgvf.nl (Milli Görü§ women federation)
• http://iournaille.de/islamismus/gorus.htm (German website about Milli Görü§) 
Remaining websites
• http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php7yil i d = l3 (election result Turkey 1999)
• http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/modiiles/secim2002/genel.asp (elections Turkey 2002)
• http://www.religionfacts.com/islam/svmbols.htm (Islamic symbols)
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• Arif Potmis, first man on the list of Islam Democraten -  November 2006
• Syp Wynia, chief editor Elsevier -  November 2006
• Mustafa Hamurcu, spokesman Milli Görü§ North Netherlands -  November 2006
• Turkish Embassy to the Netherlands -  November 2006
Nelleke Meerkerk - 96 - IEPS, February 2007
